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INTRODUCTION
The ant has long endured as a model of responsible planning and
saving.1 In Aesop's fable,2 ants worked diligently to store up winter
provisions, while the grasshopper danced and played, ridiculing the
ants for their hard work and saving ethic. When winter's snowy blan-
ket covered the land, the grasshopper came to the ants searching for
food. Without personal savings or a "safety net" from government,
family, or charity to protect him, the grasshopper faced rather bleak
prospects in the winter of his life, unable to work in order to sustain
himself.
Aesop's fable involved a simple world without government pro-
grams to influence retirement saving practices or ameliorate poverty.
The ants presumably worked and saved simply to avoid the grasshop-
per's fate, albeit in the cooperative context of their colony.3 The
grasshopper pursued a path of consumption unaffected by programs
that might require or encourage saving, or provide relief from the con-
sequences of failing to save.
Welfare and retirement security policies reflect our collective dis-
comfort with the grasshopper's predicament. Welfare programs are
designed to ensure that those who fall into poverty, for whatever rea-
son and in whatever age group, are not left to depend solely on discre-
1. See THE BOOK OF VIRTUES: A TREASURY OF GREAT MORAL STORIES 354-55 (William J.
Bennett, ed. 1993) ("The ant, like the bee, has long been held up as a paradigm of industrious-
ness."). In the Bible, the ant is touted as a role model for self-motivated work and saving:
Go to the ant, you sluggard,
Consider her ways and be wise,
Which, having no captain, overseer or ruler,
Provides her supplies in the summer,
And gathers her food in the harvest.
PROVERBS 6:6-8 (New King James).
2. See The Grasshopper and the Ants in AEsoP's FABLES 78-79 (Belinda Gallagher, ed.,
Brimax Books 1991).
3. It should be noted that the ants were not rugged individualists. Cooperative efforts within
families or communities often formed a part of the "safety net" for their members. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 254, 257 (1982) ("The Amish believe that there is a religiously
based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the
social security system.").
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tionary charitable relief for life's necessities. 4  Financing such
programs through general tax revenues effectively requires productive
ants to contribute toward meeting the needs of others. Tax incentives
may also encourage giving to private charities, which alleviate burdens
that might otherwise fall on government programs. 5
Retirement security policies focus more narrowly on encouraging or
requiring ant-like behavior in providing for retirement. 6 These poli-
cies are based on the assumption that many people will not save
enough to sustain themselves during old age.7 Accordingly, such poli-
cies seek to prevent post-retirement poverty by providing a source of
replacement income for those leaving the workforce. Retirement se-
curity policies may also implement other social goals, such as redis-
tributing wealth, 8 reinforcing notions of equality,9 or promoting eco-
4. Means-tested welfare programs include food stamps, public housing, Medicaid, and Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI). See Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz, Should Social Security
Be Means-Tested?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY 41, 42 (Eric. R. Kingson & James
H. Schulz, eds., 1997). Although private charities also form a part of the social safety net, these
government welfare programs reflect the view that private, discretionary relief is inadequate to
address the problems of poverty. As Kingson and Schulz explain:
Early in the twentieth century, the nation rejected the approaches to social welfare that
emerged from the poor-laws tradition. The county poorhouses, the orphanages, and
the intrusive supervision of the poor by charity organizations were viewed as dehuman-
izing vestiges of a tradition dominated by programs designed, first and foremost, to
minimize malingering and sloth. The basic idea of the old tradition was that the condi-
tions of relief should be so harsh as to discourage only the most needy from seeking
support. Thus, the poorhouse became the last refuge of the desperate and destitute old,
serving also as a warning to workers and families of the consequences of having to
become dependent on public programs.
Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
5. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("The rationale for al-
lowing the deduction of charitable contributions has historically been that by doing so, the Gov-
ernment relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable
activity would fall on the shoulders of the Government.").
6. Cf Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 851, 856 & n.l (1987) (treating antipoverty and health insurance as separate
issues from retirement security).
7. Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic The-
ory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275-76 (1991).
8. For example, Social Security involves a redistributive element from higher-income to
lower-income workers to the extent that lower-income workers receive a minimum benefit re-
gardless of earnings history. See generally Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under a Partially
Privatized Social Security System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 969 (1998) (noting that Social Security
balances the "competing policy objectives [of] equity and social adequacy").
9. For example, employee benefit plans are subject to rules that proscribe discrimination in
favor of highly compensated individuals, so that workers of all economic strata have retirement
benefits. See generally MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 112 (1999).
At the heart of qualified retirement plans is the concept that they cannot discriminate
in favor of shareholders, officers, or highly compensated employees. The overall effect
is that, within limits, a qualified retirement plan must offer the same benefits to officers,
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nomic growth through increased savings rates. 10
Current retirement security policies focus primarily on Social Secur-
ity and its private sector counterparts. Among these programs are pri-
vate pensions and personal savings, which provide supplemental
replacement income."1 Compulsory participation in Social Security
ensures that nearly everyone contributes toward retirement security
needs, which might otherwise have to be met through welfare pro-
grams.12 Although more than sixty percent of retirees rely on Social
shareholders, and highly compensated employees (members of the prohibited group) as
are offered to the rank and file.
Id.
10. Neoclassical economics assumes that increased savings rates, in the long run, produce in-
creased standards of living. See Edward M. Gramlich, How Does Social Security Affect the
Economy?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY 147, 150 (Eric R. Kingson & James H.
Schulz. eds., 1997). Whether tax incentives have ultimately increased the national savings rate is
debatable. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT Staff Description (JCX-7-99) of Present
Law and Background on TFax Incentives for Savings, reprinted in BNA DAILY TAX REPORT,
February 25, 1999 ("Empirical investigations of the responsiveness of personal saving to after-tax
returns provide no conclusive results."). However, tax incentives have clearly impacted the form
in which retirement savings are held. Individual retirement accounts alone have grown from
holding virtually no assets in 1980 to nearly $2 trillion in assets in 1997. See 20 EBRI NOTES 5
(May 1999) <http://www.ebri.org.notes/0599.htm>.
1I. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 6, at 853-54. Social Security also includes other social insur-
ance aspects. such as survivor's and disability benefits. Other government programs, such as
Medicaid, are designed to address medical needs of the poor. This article focuses only on re-
placement income for retirees.
12. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-Discrimi-
nation Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 815 n.97 (1988) (noting philosophical argu-
ment that Social Security is needed to avoid state support of the elderly); id. at 820-21 (noting
forced saving as means of reducing government expenditures). Social Security retirement bene-
fits are not means tested, so that even the wealthiest participants are entitled to benefits based
on his or her earnings history. In this sense, Social Security is arguably consistent with ant-like
values of work and savings, albeit in a cooperative context that relies on shared political commit-
ments rather than private property rights. See Robert M. Ball & Thomas M. Bethell, Bridging
the Centuries: The Case for Traditional Social Security, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CEN-
TUIRY 259, 261 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz, eds., 1997) ("Social Security emphasizes and
reinforces the conservative values of work, saving, and self-help."). The view that Social Secur-
ity benefits are "earned" is an important component of its political support. See Kathryn L.
Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 131, 140-41 &
n.61 (1998). However, those "earned" benefits do not reach the status of property rights. See
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-11 (1960), which states in part:
The 'right' to Social Security benefits is in one sense 'earned,' for the entire scheme
rests on the legislative judgment that those who in their productive years were function-
ing members of the economy may justly call upon that economy, in their later years, for
protection from 'the rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting fear that such
a lot awaits them when journey's end is near.' Helvering v. Davis, supra, 301 U.S. at
page 641. But the practical effectuation of that judgment has of necessity called forth a
highly complex and interrelated statutory structure. Integrated treatment of the mani-
fold specific problems presented by the Social Security program demands more than a
generalization. That program was designed to function into the indefinite future, and
its specific provisions rest on predications as to expected economic conditions which
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Security benefits as their primary source of replacement income,' 3
most retirees require supplemental income in order to maintain pre-
retirement living standards.' 4 Private pensions and retirement savings
are often used to fill this income gap, thus providing an important
complementary role in achieving retirement security goals.'
5
Tax law is the principal device used to implement government poli-
cies relating to private retirement savings.' 6 Some policies are based
on inducing voluntary saving decisions. For example, by offering con-
ditional opportunities to reduce income tax obligations, the govern-
ment has attempted to induce retirement saving in special tax-favored
plans. Nonsavers may shift from consumption to saving, 17 or savers
may shift the form of their savings into tax-favored vehicles in order
to obtain tax benefits. 18 Matching employer contributions available in
must inevitably prove less than wholly accurate, and on judgments and preferences as
to the proper allocation of the Nation's resources which evolving economic and social
conditions will of necessity in some degree modify.
To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued property rights'
would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to everchanging condi-
tions which it demands.
Id. at 610.
13. See Senator Don Nickles, Retiring in America: Why the United States Needs a New Kind of
Social Security for the New Millenium, 36 HARV. J. ON LEcIs. 77, 77 & n.4 (1999).
14. Daniel 1. Halperin, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: A Rational Model for the 21st Cen-
tury, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 159, 161 & n.13 (Jack L.
VanDerhei, ed. 1987); Weiss, supra note 7, at 1284 ("The public component of retirement in-
come, Social Security, is seldom adequate to provide income maintenance.").
15. See Michael S. Gordon, Introduction: The Social Policy Origins of ERISA, in EMPLOYEE
BENEFrI's LAW lxiii, lxxi (Stephen J. Sacher, et. al., eds., 1991) (noting possibility that private
pensions have flourished "because of Social Security's failure to prescribe more socially ade-
quate benefits."); Halperin, supra note 14, at 159. Although some commentators have argued for
an expanded government role in providing retirement income, recent reform proposals favoring
privatization of a portion of Social Security suggest a limited political tolerance for that ap-
proach. For a critique of privatization, see generally Moore, Privatization of Social Security,
supra note 12.
16. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 6, at 854 ("tax legislation serves as the dominant public mech-
anism for implementing national retirement policy"); Bankman, supra note 12, at 793 ("[li]t is
generally assumed that the growth and structure of private pension plans is in part a product of
federal tax law."). For fiscal year 2001, the net exclusion for pension contributions and earnings
for employer-provided plans is estimated to reduce tax receipts by $92.39 billion, representing
the largest tax expenditure in the federal budget. See Treasury Dep't General Explanation of
Clinton Administration's Fiscal Year 2001 Revenue Proposals, and Excerpts from President Clin-
ton's FY 2001 Budget Submitted to Congress Feb. 7, 2000, reprinted in BNA DAILY TAX REPORT,
Feb. 8, 2000, at Table 5-3 (illustrating "[m]ajor Tax Expenditures in the Income Tax, Ranked by
Total 2001 Revenue Loss").
17. Tax benefits presumably increase the perceived value of future consumption, as compared
with current consumption. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 1286-87. However, other psychological
factors may also affect these decisions. See id. at 1300. See also Joint Committee on Taxation,
supra note 10.
18. See infra Part II.C., for further discussion of these benefits.
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some retirement plans may provide an added incentive for employee
participation. 19
Other policies affecting employer-provided plans may effectively
force employees to save, although they might prefer current consump-
tion.20 For example, nondiscrimination and minimum participation
requirements imposed on employers appear to harness some employ-
ees' voluntary preferences for tax-favored savings in order to broaden
participation in retirement savings plans. 21 In denying employees a
choice to receive cash compensation in lieu of retirement benefits, and
restricting access to retirement fund contributions, employer-funded
plans may effectively require "grasshoppers" to save.22
Current law also provides tax-favored retirement saving options for
self-employed business owners. Unlike an employee, an entrepre-
neur's choice to participate in a tax-favored plan is not limited by an
employer's design. In this sense, the entrepreneur has greater discre-
tion than an employee to choose and structure retirement savings. 23
However, small business owners must also consider the competing
need to increase business capital in evaluating the form of their invest-
ment.2 4 Prohibited transaction rules generally preclude small business
19. See infra note 138.
20. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 1280.
21. See id.
22. Employers may also benefit from forcing employee participation in retirement savings
plans. For example, an employer is allowed to defer vesting of pension benefits, which can be
used to induce long-term employment commitments from employees. See I.R.C. § 411 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
23. See Richard J. Kovach, Tax Complexity, Regulatory Ambivalence, and Disparate Benefits
and Burdens in Deferred Compensation Planning for Small Business, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
141, 141-42 (1998):
[E]arning a living as an employee who has no control over the employer, a situation
shared by millions of American workers, allows very little flexibility for self-actuated
deferred compensation planning. Aside from the privilege of making an annual contri-
bution of only $2,000 to an individual retirement account established personally, all
possibilities for tax-favored deferred compensation savings reside solely within the dis-
cretion of employers. Those who earn their livings through self-employment become
their own employers by technical designation and thus assume for themselves full dis-
cretion to implement qualified deferred compensation arrangements both for personal
benefit and to enrich their common law employees ....
Id. at 141 (citations omitted).
24. See Jill R. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. LAw 57, 58-62 (1998). Professor Fisch provides a particularly lucid
and concise description of the travails of the entrepreneur in small business financing:
IT]he general economy is substantially affected by small business economics. At the
same time, small businesses are critically dependent on adequate capital sources. "The
chief cause of small business failures-after management error-is lack of capital."
Traditionally, small businesses have had limited financing options. An entrepreneur
typically funds the operations of a start-up company through a combination of personal
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owners from using capital in tax-favored retirement savings to satisfy
business investment needs.25 Thus, an investment in tax-favored re-
tirement savings is often an unrealistic choice for many small business
owners, particularly during the start-up and growth phases of their
businesses when capital formation demands are at their peak.
Investing outside of tax-favored retirement vehicles may also en-
hance retirement security. Equity in a small business can provide a
source of supplemental retirement income. However, investing in a
business, rather than a tax-favored retirement plan, generally places
small business owners at a disadvantage. This is particularly true if
they dispose of business assets in taxable transactions in order to pro-
vide supplemental income for retirement. 26 This disadvantage poten-
tially impacts their retirement security, serving to inhibit the efficient
redeployment of business assets to the extent that taxable dispositions
of those assets generate less favorable results than holding them until
death. 27
This article focuses on current policies affecting tax-favored retire-
ment savings for small business owners. Part II provides an overview
of tax-favored retirement savings options, and the wealth accumula-
tion advantages of tax-favored saving.28 Part III discusses empirical
data suggesting that many small business owners do not participate in
tax-favored retirement saving; capital formation demands are a plausi-
funds and the contributions of friends and family members. Following the exhaustion
of this seed money, the business must look to other capital sources.
Loans are one possible source of small business capital. Studies show that bank loans
are the primary source of outside capital for small businesses. Nonetheless, small busi-
nesses often have difficulty qualifying for bank loans; they frequently lack the necessary
collateral, operating history and proven track record. Economic fluctuations and
changes in the banking industry may also create credit crunches that limit the amount
of money available for small business loans. As a result, although bank loans are criti-
cal to small businesses, small businesses receive only a small share of the credit availa-
ble to U.S. companies. Those businesses that are successful in obtaining bank financing
are most likely to be those in which the owners have sufficient personal wealth to pro-
vide personal guarantees or collateral as security.
Bank loans may also be a problematic capital source for small businesses. The cash
flow demands of debt financing can be burdensome and may limit the opportunity for
growth through reinvestment of earnings. Businesses may be unable to meet interest
obligations during periods of economic uncertainty. Finally, the traditional conserva-
tism of bank loan officers may be incompatible with the risks of entrepreneurship.
Loan terms that allow a bank to block risky projects or ambitious expansion may crip-
ple business development.
Id. at 59-61 (citations omitted).
25. See infra section IV.
26. See infra section IV.B.
27. See infra section IV.C.
28. See infra section II.
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ble explanation for such nonparticipation. 29 Part IV discusses tax fea-
tures affecting the lifecycle of a small business. 30 For instance, capital
investments and dispositions of business property illustrate the disad-
vantages of investing outside of tax-favored accounts. Finally, Part V
provides suggestions for reform, which include: (1) expanding the op-
tions to access funds from tax-favored plans; (2) changing the income
base for contributions to tax-favored plans to include gains from the
sale of business property; and (3) allowing additional contributions to
tax-favored plans up to a defined maximum balance for those transi-
tioning to retirement.31
II. OVERVIEW OF TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVINGS
From the perspective of neoclassical economics, a decision to save is
a function of the comparative utility of current or deferred consump-
tion.32 Thus, the decision is akin to a consumer's choice of one good
over another, requiring a personal calculus of the comparative bene-
fits of each alternative. 33 Although our society generally values and
protects individual choices in consumption patterns, tax law has
emerged as a means to influence this calculus for retirement savings. 34
Tax-qualified savings vehicles, such as employer-provided pensions,
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), and Keogh plans, receive
tax-favored treatment that create a powerful advantage in wealth ac-
cumulation. 35 However, conditions on tax-favored status also create
barriers to participation that may be particularly troublesome for
small business owners.36
A. Timing Principles for Income and Deductions
The proper time for including income or taking into account liabil-
ity for income tax purposes is an important issue to both taxpayers
and the government. 3 General principles governing the timing of in-
come and deductions that apply outside of tax-qualified retirement
29. See infra section III.
30. See infra section IV.
31. See infra section V.
32. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 1285-88.
33. See id.
34. See id. See also Hon. Bill Bradley, Economic Security in Retirement: Whose Responsibil-
ity?, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 1, 5-9 (Jack L. VanDerhei, ed.
1987).
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. See infra Part II.D.
37. Cf. Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1998) ("In tax, as in comedy,
timing matters.").
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plans are helpful in establishing a benchmark to evaluate the nature
and extent of tax preferences applicable to tax-qualified retirement
plans.
1. Income
Section 451 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides the fol-
lowing general rule for the year in which income is taken into account:
"The amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the
gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer,
unless, under the method of accounting used in computing taxable in-
come, such amount is to be properly accounted for as of a different
period. '38 This provision indicates that taxation upon receipt is the
default rule, though receipt does not always govern the time for taxa-
tion. The taxpayer's accounting method is essential to resolving this
question of timing.
For accrual method taxpayers, "income is includable in gross in-
come when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive
such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasona-
ble accuracy. '39 In focusing on the right to receive, rather than actual
receipt of cash or other property, an accrual method taxpayer may be
required to take income into account before receiving payment.40
Since a right to receive income is likely to have value before it is re-
duced to cash, the resulting measure of income is closer to the classical
Haig-Simons approach than a method focusing only on actual
receipt.4 t
For cash method taxpayers, which include virtually all employees,
regulations clarify that income is recognized in the year of "actual or
constructive receipt. '42 Unlike the accrual method, an unsecured
38. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1994).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
40. See Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781 (11th Cir. 1984)
(Under the accrual method, "[t]ransactions producing income ... spring to life in the eyes of the
seer though nary a dollar has moved.").
41. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.
J. 506, 508-09 (1986) ("Haig-Simons definition ... suggests that all changes in asset value should
be taken into account as they occur."); id. at 506-07 (noting that accountants and economists
view accrual as "the proper standard in principle" in answering the question of timing). Al-
though the cash method is widely used, it should be noted that it does not conform to generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See American Fletcher Corp. v. United States, 832
F.2d 436, 439-40 (7th Cir. 1987); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 604-05 (1985) (containing the House
Committee on Ways & Means report on the Tax Reform Act of 1983 to the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1997); § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993). As
a technical matter, constructive receipt may also apply to accrual basis taxpayers, such as in
determining whether actual receipt has occurred in the case of a taxable advance payment. See 4
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promise to pay is not a sufficient basis to recognize income under the
cash method.43 Regulations explain the constructive receipt concept as
follows:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is
credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made availa-
ble so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have
drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to with-
draw had been given. However, income is not constructively re-
ceived if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial
limitations or restrictions. 44
The constructive receipt doctrine developed as a method to ensure
that taxpayers could not simply defer taxable income at will.45 As a
result, "[wihen compensation for services is due and payable, a tax-
payer cannot defer recognition of the income by requesting the em-
ployer, customer, or client to delay payment or to place the funds in
an escrow or other account to be paid out at a later time."' 46 However,
constructive receipt may be avoided if the payor imposes restrictions
on the right to receive income before that right accrues, and the payee
does not initiate these restrictions. 47 Thus, it may be possible to defer
taxation beyond the period in which income is earned if access to that
income is restricted.
2. Deductions
Section 461 of the Code sets forth a cryptic rule which states that
liabilities are taken into account for "the proper taxable year under
the method of accounting used in computing taxable income."'48 For
cash method taxpayers, this rule generally means that expenditures
giving rise to deductions are taken into account in the taxable year
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAi TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, ANiD GIFrs
105.3.3, at 105-51 & n.21 (2nd ed. 1992).
43. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2 C.B. 121, and
Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100.
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
45. STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING $ 3.02[2][b], at 3-22 (1998).
46. Id.
47. See id. As a practical matter, the Commissioner has taken the position that it will not
speculate whether an employer would have agreed to pay compensation without imposing a
restriction. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 ("the statute cannot be administered by specu-
lating whether the payor would have been willing to agree to an earlier payment.") This ap-
proach eliminates the practical question of whether an employee bargained for a condition for
purposes of constructive receipt.
48. I.R.C. § 461(a) (1994).
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when paid. 49 Payment may occur through cash, checks, or other prop-
erty, but the taxpayer's own note is generally not considered payment;
a mere promise to pay in the future is not a sufficient basis for a de-
duction by a cash method taxpayer.5°
For an accrual method taxpayer, regulations provide the following
basic requirements for taking into account a liability:
Under an accrual method of accounting, a liability ... is incurred,
and generally taken into account for Federal income tax purposes,
in the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that estab-
lish the fact of liability, the amount of the liability can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has
occurred with respect to the liability.51
This all-events test, which includes a so-called "economic perform-
ance" requirement, limits the accrual method taxpayer's ability to
take into account liabilities in advance of payment.52 The economic
performance rules are implemented through regulations that seek to
identify those circumstances where it is proper to permit accrual prior
to payment. 53 For example, if a fixed liability relates to services pro-
vided to the taxpayer, economic performance occurs as those services
are provided, even though actual payment may occur later.54
3. Application to Deferred Compensation (Non-Qualified Plans)
The general principles discussed previously indicate that when an
employer places funds in an unrestricted account for the purpose of
compensating an employee, that employee clearly has income in the
year those funds are made available. 55 In such circumstances, an em-
ployee obtains either cash or a property right that is equivalent to
cash, 56 making taxation appropriate under either cash or accrual
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a) (as amended in 1994). See GERTZMAN, supra note 45, 3.04[5], at
3-34 (discussing this general rule and numerous exceptions).
50. See GERTZMAN, supra note 45, 1 3.04[4], at 3-32.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1994). See GERTZMAN, supra note 45,
4.04, at 4-35 for further exposition of these requirements.
52. The term "liability" includes both deductible expenses and capitalized costs. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(B) (as amended in 1997).
53. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.461-4,-5 (as amended in 1995).
54. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(6)(i) (as amended in 1995). Certain other exceptions may
apply, such as provisions for recurring items, which further complicate this analysis. See
GERTZMAN, supra note 45, T 4.04[3][f], at 4-58.
55. See GERTZMAN, supra note 45, T 3.03[3][c], at 3-27. Courts have held that notice is not
required; the mere existence of a right to access is determinative. See id.
56. See id. Section 83 of the Code contains specific rules governing the taxability of the re-
ceipt of property. However, unfunded deferred compensation is not covered by section 83, as
there has been no transfer of property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985) ("For
purposes of section 83 and the regulations thereunder, the term "property" includes real and
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methods.57 Moreover, the employer may take this payment into ac-
count as a deduction in the current year,58 provided that capitalization
is not required.59
However, by imposing restrictions on access to payment, a deferred
compensation arrangement could potentially allow cash method em-
ployees to defer taxation until cash is received, even though compen-
sation has been earned. For example, suppose that on January 1, year
one (Y1), an employer agrees to pay an employee $10x on January 1,
year two (Y2), for services performed during Y1. Assume further that
the employer's promise is unsecured and contingent on performance
of services during Y1, but the right to payment is otherwise not for-
feitable. The employee completes the required services during Y1,
and thus becomes entitled to payment.
An accrual basis taxpayer performing these services would recog-
nize $10x of income in Y1. In this situation, the promise to pay satis-
fies the all-events test once the services have been completed, and
thus income must be taken into account prior to actual receipt. 60
However, for a cash method taxpayer, the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) has ruled under similar facts that income recognition is de-
ferred until receipt of the cash payment.6' Even though the cash
method taxpayer may have a valuable right (assuming that the em-
ployer is creditworthy), this unsecured promise does not satisfy the
requirements of constructive receipt. 62 The hypothetical possibility
that the employer may have agreed to pay this compensation before
the year Y2 does not change the result because the Service has ruled
that "the statute cannot be administered by speculating whether the
payor would have been willing to agree to an earlier payment. '63
With respect to the payor's treatment, a cash-method employer
would not be permitted to deduct the compensation until Y2, when it
personal property other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money
or property in the future." (emphasis added)).
57. See Felicia D. Brown, Note, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans and Constructive
Receipt: Martin v. Commissioner, 45 TAx LAw. 635, 644-45 (1992).
58. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (allowing deduction for "ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including . . . a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered").
59. Otherwise deductible compensation may be subject to capitalization requirements. See
GERTZMAN, supra note 45, 6.06[2][c], at 6-40 (discussing capitalization of deferred compensa-
tion as an inventoriable cost).
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
61. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, supra note 43.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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was paid. An accrual method employer could potentially satisfy the
general principles for accrual outlined above. However, Congress has
enacted a special rule precluding such an accrual before the employee
includes the amount in income. 64 This provision has the effect of plac-
ing employers on the cash method with respect to deferred pay-
ments. 65 As a result, the provision prevents timing differences
between the employer's deduction and the employee's receipt of in-
come, which could detrimentally effect the United States Treasury.66
While the above example involves an unfunded and unsecured
promise, different rules may apply if the employer funds a trust to
secure a promise of deferred compensation. Assume that the em-
ployer in the example discussed above deposits funds into an irrevoca-
ble trust for the benefit of the employee. Assume further that trust
benefits are accessible by the employee only after normal retirement
age, and the employee's interest in the trust is not otherwise forfeita-
ble. The employee has received a valuable property right in the trust,
which differs from an employer's unsecured promise. However,
whether this right is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of construc-
tive receipt is an open question.67 Congress enacted a special rule to
deal with the uncertainty of such circumstances. Section 404(b)(1) of
the Code requires that contributions to a trust, that are not otherwise
exempt, 68 are taxable to the employee using principles similar to those
under section 83.69 Thus, the employee would be taxed based on the
fair market value of the vested interest in the employer's contribu-
tion. 70 As with an unfunded promise, the special rule of section
404(a)(5) governs the timing of the employer's deduction, effectively
64. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (1994). For a discussion of the history and interpretation of this
provision, see 2 Br-rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 60.2, at 60-15.
65. See Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1963).
66. As Professor Halperin has pointed out, deferring a deduction for the payor may be an
alternative, equivalent approach to taxing the recipient. See Halperin, Interest in Disguise. supra
note 41, at 519-20.
67. In particular, the concern would be whether the property rights constituted a cash
equivalent. See 4 BrI--KER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, $ 105.3.2, at 105-48 (noting inconsistency
in judicial approaches to resolving cash equivalency problems); GERTZMAN, supra note 45,
3.03[1][d], at 3-15 (noting the same effect).
68. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of exempt trusts under tax-qualified plans.
69. See I.R.C. § 404(b)(1) (1994). As in section 83, the fair market value of rights acquired
can be taken into account when such rights are either transferable or free from a substantial risk
of forfeiture. See 2 BiITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, $ 60.3, at 60-26.
70. See 2 B13rrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 1 60.3, at 60-26. Certain highly compensated
employees may even be taxed on the total increase in the value of vested accrued benefits, not
just on the annual contribution. This represents a penalty designed to discourage non-exempt
trusts, particularly when highly compensated employees are beneficiaries. See id.
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matching the deduction to the period in which the employee recog-
nizes income. 7'
Using a trust as a funding vehicle also presents additional complex-
ity concerning taxation of trust income and distributions. Alternative
tax treatments of trust income are theoretically possible. For exam-
ple, the trust could be taxed as a separate entity,72 or the employee
could be taxed under rules similar to those applicable to grantor
trusts.73 However, the Code imposes tax on the non-exempt trust,
specifically denying grantor trust treatment to the beneficiary.74 Trust
income over $8,350 is taxed at 39.6 percent, 75 while this rate applies
only to taxable incomes over $278,450 for other individual taxpayers. 76
Thus, trust taxation is generally disadvantageous to those with margi-
nal tax rates of less than 39.6 percent.
Special rules also apply to distributions that are even more disad-
vantageous to the beneficiary. Under general principles of trust taxa-
tion, beneficiaries of complex trusts receiving distributions of income
that had been previously accumulated and taxed to a trust are not
taxed on such distributions. If the beneficiaries are taxed, they will
receive a credit for tax previously paid by the trust.77 Thus, distrib-
uted income is taxed only once, with potential adjustments occurring
in limited circumstances to ensure that the trust was not used to ob-
tain a lower tax rate than otherwise applicable to the beneficiary. 78
71. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(6) (1994).
72. See I.R.C. § 641 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
73. See generally I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). It may also be appropriate to tax
trust income to the employer, to the extent that the employer, not the employee, is deemed to be
the beneficial owner. See Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1985).
74. See I.R.C. § 402(b)(3) (1994). See 2 BITI'KER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 60.3, at 60-26.
75. See I.R.C. § 1(e) (1994), as adjusted for inflation through 1998, in Rev. Proc. 97-57, 1997-
52 I.R.B. 20.
76. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (1994) (married individuals filing joint returns); § 1(b) (1994) (heads of
households); § 1(c) (1994) (unmarried individuals), as adjusted for inflation through 1998, in
Rev. Proc. 97-57, 1997-52 I.R.B. 20.
77. See JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 10.4.10 (1992) (sum-
marizing "throwback rules" under I.R.C. §§ 665-667 affecting distributions from complex trusts).
These "throwback rules" were effectively repealed for most domestic trusts by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, which enacted current I.R.C. § 665(c). However, these "throwback rules"
may still apply to certain domestic trusts created before March 1, 1984 and foreign trusts. See
I.R.C. § 665(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
78. See PRICE, supra note 77, at § 10.4.10. As Price points out, the rate arbitrage that gave rise
to the throwback rules was substantially curtailed by lowering individual tax rates. Raising tax
rates applicable to trusts further eliminates this potential for tax abuse, thus giving rise to the
exemption for domestic trusts in current I.R.C. § 665(c). See CCH, TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF
1997: LAW AND EXPLANATION II 275, at 204 (1997).
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Section 402(b)(2) of the Code requires these trust distributions to
be taxed by applying the principles that are applicable to annuities, 79
however, the Code does not take into account taxes previously im-
posed on the trust.80 Although the beneficiary is allowed to recover a
portion of each distribution tax free, this portion is limited to the
amounts previously taxed to the beneficiary, not to the trust.81 Thus,
accumulated trust earnings that were taxed once to the trust are effec-
tively taxed again upon distribution. This method has a distinct disad-
vantage as compared to general tax principles applicable to trusts.
82
B. Principles Governing Tax-Favored Retirement Savings:
Employer-Sponsored Qualified Plans, Individual
Retirement Accounts, and Keogh Plans
Tax-favored retirement savings plans, including employer-provided
qualified retirement plans, individual retirement accounts, and Keogh
plans, provide opportunities to achieve tax benefits that are otherwise
unavailable under the general principles discussed above. However,
these tax benefits are conditioned upon compliance with various pro-
visions designed to implement retirement security policies. As dis-
cussed below, the particular conditions vary, since each savings vehicle
reflects a patchwork approach rather than a seamless web of protec-
tion for retirees.
1. Employer-Sponsored Qualified Retirement Plans
A "qualified plan" generally refers to a pension, profit-sharing,
stock bonus, or annuity plan utilizing a trust that meets the require-
ments of section 401(a) of the Code. 83 Stated very generally, section
401(a) requires a domestic trust 84 for the exclusive benefit of employ-
ees or their beneficiaries.8 5 The trust must also meet other require-
ments, including minimum participation standards, 86 and compliance
with rules prohibiting discrimination in favor of highly compensated
79. See I.R.C. § 72 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
80. See I.R.C. § 402(b)(2) (1994). See 2 BVrFrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 60.3, at 60-26.
81. See 2 BrTrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 60.3, at 60-26.
82. See id.
83. See id. 61.2, at 61-16. See also CANAN, supra note 9, § 1.6[D].
84. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (referring to "trust created or organized in the
United States").
85. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1994) (requiring impossibility for "any part of the corpus or income
to be ... used for, or diverted to, purposes other than the exclusive benefit of his employees or
their beneficiaries"). Congress imposed this requirement in 1938 in response to perceived em-
ployer abuses of tax-favored pension trusts. See EMPLOYEE BENEFrrs LAW, supra note 15, at 71.
86. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1994) (imposing minimum participation requirements of I.R.C.
§ 410).
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employees. 8 7  Additionally, the trust needs to comply with certain
other conditions designed to protect beneficiaries and insure that
funds will be used to provide retirement benefits.88
In contrast to the nonqualified deferred compensation trusts dis-
cussed above, both employers and employees potentially benefit from
tax-qualified status. First, employees are eligible to defer taxation on
employer contributions until the taxable year in which distributions
occur.8 9 These amounts would otherwise be taxable to employees
when they received a vested right in the trust which is likely to occur
before distributions begin. 90 Second, employers are eligible to take
these contributions into account during the current year,91 rather than
deferring them until employees include a corresponding amount in
their taxable income.92 Third, a qualified trust is exempt from taxa-
tion on its income;93 such income is taxed to beneficiaries upon distri-
bution. 94 As discussed below, although only tax deferral is apparent
from this scheme, this deferral potentially results in an exemption
from taxation for investment income, which provides a powerful in-
centive for participation. 95
Qualified retirement plans can be categorized as defined benefit or
defined contribution plans. Defined benefit plans involve a commit-
ment to provide employees with predetermined retirement benefits. 96
Under current law, defined benefits may not exceed the lesser of
$130,000 or a participant's average compensation for his "high 3
years" of employment.97 Employers are obligated to contribute the
87. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in favor of highly compensated
employees as defined in I.R.C. § 414(q)).
88. See 2 BIrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 1 61.2, at 61-16.
89. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (1994). Additional deferral may be allowed when a nontransferable
annuity contract is distributed from a qualified plan. See 2 Br1-KER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 91
61.13.1, at 61-151. Distributions from a qualified plan may also be rolled over into an IRA,
which can defer taxation until distributions are made from the IRA. See I.R.C. § 402(c) (1994).
90. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
91. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Deductions are subject to the general
limitations on reasonable compensation in sections 162 and 212 of the Code. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.404(a)-1 (b) (as amended in 1963). Applicable capitalization requirements must also be taken
into account, as when employer contributions involve labor engaged in inventory production.
See I.R.C. § 263A (1994). Other limitations may also apply, such as limitations on excess contri-
butions. See infra Part II.D.
92. See supra note 66.
93. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994).
94. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
95. See infra Part II.C.
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1976). Certain other benefits, such as
payment upon disability, may also be included among "retirement" benefits. See id.
97. See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The $90,000 figure stated in
§ 415(b)(1)(A) is subject to annual cost-of-living adjustments. See I.R.C. § 415(d) (1994). The
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actuarially determined costs of providing the benefits prescribed in
the plan documents. 98 Thus, employers bear the responsibility of en-
suring that trust assets are adequate to satisfy those future benefit
commitments.99 Regulations governing pension funding and invest-
ment are designed to reduce the risk of default to employees. 00 Fed-
erally provided insurance protection from the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is designed to provide additional se-
curity for participants in the event of default. 10'
In a defined contribution plan, the employer's obligation extends
only to making specified contributions, which are allocated to sepa-
rate accounts for each participant. 0 2 Current law generally allows a
maximum contribution of 25 percent of compensation or $30,000,
whichever is less. 10 3 Retirement benefit levels ultimately depend on
the contributions and earnings accumulated for each participant's ac-
count. In this way, employees bear investment risks associated with
planning for their expected retirement needs. 104 Defined contribution
plans may also allow self-directed investments, which impose further
responsibility on employees for their retirement security. 0 5 Superior
investment performance could result in a windfall, but poor perform-
ance could leave the employee disappointed and insecure at
retirement.
applicable figure for 1999 is $130,000. See Notice 98-53, 1998-46 I.R.B. 24. The "high 3 years" is
defined in I.R.C. § 415(b)(3). Failure to comply with this benefit limitation disqualifies the trust.
See I.R.C. § 401(a)(16) (1994). Adjustments to these limitations may apply, such as when pen-
sion benefits begin either before or after the social security retirement age. See I.R.C.
§ 415(b)(2)(C) & (D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
98. See I.R.C. § 415(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
99. See 2 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 91 61.1.3, at 61-151.
100. See generally JAMES H. SMALHOUT, THE UNC1.RTAIN RETIREMENT 7-13 (1996) (discuss-
ing origins of ERISA protections).
101. See id. However, Smalhout points out that in 1990, only 16.9 percent of the total
workforce was covered by this insurance. Id. at 13.
102. See I.R.C. § 414(i) (1994). For example, contributions may be defined as a percentage of
compensation, or in a profit sharing plan, as a percentage of corporate profits. See CANAN,
supra note 9, at § 3.111[A].
103. See I.R.C. § 415(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). However, practical constraints, such as non-
discrimination provisions, may limit the ability to contribute the maximum amount in particular
cases. See 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 61.4, at 61-154; CANAN, supra note 9, at § 10.4.
104. See CANAN, supra note 9, at § 3.1 ll[G]. Federal insurance protection from the PBGC is
not available for defined contribution plans. See 19 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1994) (exempting cover-
age for "individual account plans"). Although defined contribution plans avoid administrative
costs associated with PBGC insurance premiums, the lack of coverage emphasizes that the locus
of risk bearing is on the employees.
105. A detailed discussion of fiduciary obligations is beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, even participant-directed investments in individual account plans do not completely elimi-
nate fiduciary obligations. See CANAN, supra note 9, at §§ 16.03 to .04.
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Some commentators prefer defined benefit plans as the most effec-
tive means of meeting retirement security goals, based in part on the
assumption that employers are better able to deal with the risks asso-
ciated with providing adequate retirement benefits. 1°6 Nevertheless,
employers are increasingly utilizing defined contribution plans.10 7
This trend may be due to such factors as the cost and administrative
complexity associated with defined benefit plans, and an aversion to
risks associated with meeting defined benefit commitments over po-
tentially drawn out time-frames. 08
Defined contributions plans are not immune from problems of ad-
ministrative complexity and costs. Congress addressed this problem
in the Revenue Act of 1978,109 by enacting a simplified form of de-
fined contribution plan known as a Simplified Employee Pension
(SEP). 110 The Senate Finance Committee Report explained the reason
for providing this new retirement savings vehicle as follows:
The committee is aware that many qualified pension plans have
been terminated in the recent past due, in part, to the complex and
burdensome rules they are required to satisfy. The committee be-
lieves that these rules have also had the effect of retarding the intro-
duction of new pension plans. The committee is concerned that,
because of the expense and effort required to comply with present
rules for tax qualified plans, many employees, particularly the em-
ployees of small businesses, will not earn employer-provided retire-
ment benefits.' I I
Rather than using a tax-exempt trust, the SEP uses an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA) for each employee as the vehicle to
106. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 6, at 892. However, it should be noted that in times of
extraordinarily positive market performance, employees in defined contribution plans reap ben-
efits otherwise retained by employers in defined benefit plans, which are subject to reversion by
the employer. For a discussion of reversions from defined benefit trusts, see 2 BI1rKER & LOK-
KEN, supra note 42, $1 61.13, at 61-151.
107. See, e.g., SMALHOUT, supra note 96, at 11-12. Traditional, defined benefit plans have
decreased from $103,346 in 1975 to only $53,000 in 1997. See Rebecca Adams, Pension Rewrite
Handcuffed to Dead-End Tax Cut Bill, 57 C.Q. WEEKiLY 2004 (1999) (reporting data from Em-
ployee Benefits Research Institute).
108. See SMALHOUT, supra note 100, at 12; Halperin, supra note 14, at 186-90. See also
CANAN, supra note 9, at 252.
Typically, a defined benefit plan is subject to more administrative burdens than a de-
fined contribution plan, because of the necessity of calculating continuing employer
contributions and because of additional reporting and compliance requirements. It also
has the cost of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) premiums. With a plan
covering 100 or more employees, the additional burden may not be significant; how-
ever, a small employer may find the additional compliance cost substantial.
109. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, § 152 (1978).
110. See id.
111. S. REP. No. 95-1263, at 92 (1978).
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achieve tax-favored retirement saving. 1 2 The IRA essentially relieves
the employer from fiduciary obligations otherwise associated with
plans involving trusts.113 Moreover, employers may use a simplified
form to adopt a model SEP, which contains all applicable require-
ments and avoids special document preparation. 14
Under present law, employers may contribute up to 15 percent of
compensation, with a maximum of $24,000, to an employee's SEP-
IRA.1 5 These contributions are excludable from the employee's tax-
able income, 116 while distributions are included in taxable income pur-
suant to general provisions governing IRAs.' 1 7 Contributions need
not be made every year. When contributions are made, it must be
pursuant to a written allocation formula. 1 8 Moreover, the contribu-
tions must include all employees age twenty-one and over, who per-
formed services during at least three of the five previous years, and
who have received at least $400 in compensation from the employer
during the current year.' 9 Although benefits in other defined contri-
bution plans may be subject to deferred vesting requirements, SEP
provisions require full vesting for all contributions.120
112. IRAs are discussed further in infra part II.C.2.
113. See INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLANS GUIDE (CCH) 91 2280 (1999).
114. For a more detailed discussion of requirements for establishing a SEP and the limitations
of Model SEPs adopted using Form 5305-SEP, see id. [1 2260, 2350. See also CANAN, supra
note 9, at § 4.8[D] (discussing reports and forms required for SEPs).
115. See I.R.C. § 402(h)(2) (1994). This is considerably more than the $2,000 limit presently
applicable to IRAs. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(A) (1994). It should be noted that section
415(c)(1)(A) provides a general limitation of 25 percent of compensation or $30,000 for defined
contribution plans, while the special rules for SEPs in 402(h)(2) provide a limitation of only 15
percent. Further, section 408(k)(3)(C) precludes contributions based on salaries greater than
$150,000, as indexed for inflation. See I.R.C. § 408(k)(8) (1994). This figure is now $160,000. See
Notice 98-53, 1998-46 I.R.B. 24. Thus, until the salary limit in 408(k)(3)(C) increases to
$200,000, the maximum contribution limitation for a SEP will be less than the $30,000 maximum
for other qualified defined benefit pension plans.
116. See I.R.C. § 402(h)(1) (1994). Employer contributions are not subject to FICA and
FUTA taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 3121(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (FICA), 3306(b)(5) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (FUTA).
117. See I.R.C. § 402(h)(3) (1994). SEP provisions require that employees be allowed to with-
draw funds from their SEP-IRAs at any time. See I.R.C. § 408(k)(4) (1994). However, such
withdrawals are still subject to income taxes and potential penalty taxes in some circumstances.
These tax consequences are discussed in infra part Il.D.2.
118. See I.R.C. § 408(k)(5) (1994). Proposed regulations indicate that this formula may be
varied from year to year. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-7(e)(2).
119. See I.R.C. § 408(k)(3) (1994). The $3t00 compensation limit stated in section 408(k)(3) is
currently $400 as adjusted for inflation. See I.R.S. Notice 98-53, 1998-46 I.R.B. 24. It should be
noted that this three year requirement is more generous toward employers than other pension
plans, which typically require participation after only one or two years service. See INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT PLANS GUIDE, supra note 113, at 91 2270.
120. See I.R.C. § 408(k)(4) (1994) (employee withdrawals must be permitted).
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The various pension options discussed above are funded primarily
with employer contributions. Realistically speaking, the employer-
funded plans tend to force some employees to save for retirement,
despite the fact that they might otherwise prefer to receive the em-
ployer's contribution as cash compensation.'12 However, another em-
ployer-provided plan known as a "cash or deferred arrangement"
(CODA), or "401(k) plan," accommodates greater flexibility for em-
ployee discretion in participation. This feature has apparently been
popular, since CODAs have contributed significantly to growth in
qualified plan participation during the past two decades. 22
Under a CODA, employees have the option of receiving cash com-
pensation or contributing it to a qualified trust. 23 Although the con-
structive receipt doctrine would arguably require taxation to the
employee, the Code permits these contributions to be made with
pretax dollars in much the same manner as employer contributions to
qualified pensions. 24 Thus, employees are not taxable on the
amounts they contribute, and accumulated earnings are not taxed un-
til distribution.t 25 Employers are permitted, but not required, to
match employee contributions, subject to certain limitations designed
to ensure that matching contributions do not discriminate in favor of
highly compensated employees.126
By allowing deductible voluntary employee contributions, CODAs
are treated more favorably than other qualified pension plans. 27
Qualified pension plans other than CODAs frequently fail to allow
employee contributions. If contributions are allowed, they are nonde-
ductible, although the earnings on such contributions are tax-exempt
until distribution. 28 However, CODAs are subject to more stringent
121. See infra Part ILDI.
122. See Jack VanDerhei et. al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan
Activity, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 205, 5 (January 1999). During the period 1980 through 1994,
401(k) plans accounted for approximately 77 percent of the net increase in all private pension
plans. See id.
123. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(2) (1994).
124. See John M. Vine, Cash or Deferred Arrangements: What's the Beef? What's at Stake?, 5
VA. TAX REV. 855, 863-65 (1986). Although the Service had previously ruled favorably to tax-
payers with regard to constructive receipt, it considered changing its position. Congress inter-
vened to preserve the status quo by enacting section 401(k) in 1978. See id.
125. See id.
126. See I.R.C. § 401(m) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
127. See Vine, supra note 124, at 859-60.
128. See id. at 859. However, such contributions were allowed for a short period between
1982-1987. See Don W. Llewellyn, Tax-Favored Deferred Compensation Plans-Tax Planning
for Business Owners and Executives After the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and TAMRA, 42 TAX
LAW. 435, 456 (1989). In a defined benefit plan, employee contributions must be maintained in a
separate account for each employee, which is similar to maintaining a defined contribution plan.
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contribution limits than other qualified plans. The maximum CODA
contribution was limited to $10,000 in 1999,129 while other defined
contribution plans allowed maximum contributions up to $30,000.130
This limitation may make CODAs less attractive than other qualified
plans to the extent that employees demand high levels of tax-favored
savings.
In the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Congress added
another option for voluntary employee participation, the Savings In-
centive Match Plans for Employees (SIMPLE) retirement account. 13'
SIMPLE accounts were adopted as an attempt to increase access to
retirement savings plans by employees of small businesses. 132 Employ-
ers who are eligible to offer SIMPLE accounts must not have another
qualified plan in place. 33 Furthermore, employers can have no more
than 100 employees who received at least $5,000 of compensation
from the employer during the preceding year. 134
SIMPLE plans may be structured using IRAs or CODAs, but in
either case they allow employees to make elective contributions, ex-
pressed as a percentage of their compensation, totaling up to $6,000
per year. 35 In addition, the employer is required to make a matching
contribution of up to three percent of an employee's compensation, 36
or a nonelective contribution of two percent of compensation for each
eligible employee, regardless of actual participation. 137
See 1.R.C. § 414(k) (1994); 2 BIrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, $ 61.4.3, at 61-60 n.59. Em-
ployee contributions are also subject to the constraints of section 401(m) of the Code, which are
designed to ensure that the plan is not structured to unduly benefit highly compensated employ-
ees. See id.
129. See I.R.S. Notice 98-53, 1998-46 I.R.B. 24 (stating inflation-adjusted figure under I.R.C.
§ 402(g)(1)).
130. See id. (stating inflation-adjusted figure under I.R.C. 415(c)(1)(A)).
131. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, §§ 1421-1422. 110
Stat. 1755, 1792-1801 (1996). See generally I.R.C. § 408(p) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
132. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 235-37 (1996). As discussed below, proportionally
fewer small businesses offer retirement savings plans for their employees as compared to their
larger counterparts. See infra Part III.
133. See I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
134. See I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(C)(i) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
135. See I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
136. See I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(A)(iii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring matching contribution
which "does not exceed the applicable percentage of compensation for the year");
§ 408(p)(2)(C)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining "applicable percentage" as 3 percent, with
limited exceptions to elect a lower percentage under certain conditions).
137. See I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). It should be noted that this 2 percent
nonelective contribution is limited to the maximum compensation limitation stated in I.R.C.
§ 407(a)(17). See I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This amount is currently
$160,000, as adjusted for inflation. See Notice 98-53, 1998-46 I.R.B. 24. Thus, an employer's
nonelective contribution may not exceed $3,200 for any employee.
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Whether structured as SIMPLE 401(k) plans or as SIMPLE IRAs,
these savings vehicles are treated similarly to other qualified plans,
allowing tax deferral on contributions and income earned within the
account until distributions are made. 138 SIMPLE 401(k) plans are de-
signed to avoid special nondiscrimination tests and so-called "top-
heavy" rules applicable to other 401(k) plans. This feature may make
SIMPLE 401(k) plans attractive to some employers, despite the lower
contribution amounts.139
Voluntary participation in 401(k) and SIMPLE plans is desirable
from the perspective of economic efficiency. 14° Employees subject to
high marginal tax rates who have high savings preferences may value
tax-favored savings, while those with low marginal tax rates and a
preference for consumption may heavily discount the value of future
consumption during retirement.' 4 ' Thus, an employer's retirement
plan contributions for employees who do not value them arguably
causes a wasteful distortion.
Despite efficiency benefits, discretionary savings options fail to en-
sure retirement security for all workers. Tax incentives, on their own,
may be insufficient to induce voluntary participation by those who
have pressing needs for current consumption and/or lower marginal
tax rates. An employer's matching contributions may encourage par-
ticipation where tax incentives fall short, but only SIMPLE plans have
a matching requirement. CODAs under section 401(k) do not require
employers to make matching contributions, although employers may
choose to make them in order to ensure compliance with anti-discrim-
ination rules. 142
138. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-737, supra note 132.
139. For a critical assessment of SIMPLE plans, see David M. Graf, 1996 Pension Simplifica-
tion, 19 U. ARK. LrIr-LE ROCK L.J. 563, 563-65 (1997).
140. See Richard A. Ippolito, Pensions and Economics: Towards an Efficient Retirement Pol-
icy, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 3343 (Jack L. VanDerhei, ed.
1987).
141. See id. See also Bankman, supra note 12, at 805-12 (explaining similar efficiency concerns
with respect to nondiscrimination provisions).
142. See CANAN, supra note 9, at § 3.92[A][2], at 225-26.
The employer is not required to make matching contributions. However, most employ-
ers like the idea of encouraging employees to save, and a matching contribution nor-
mally encourages elective deferrals by employees. Matching a certain percentage of
the employee's elective contribution is a way to encourage this practice. Also, a match-
ing contribution is generally perceived as a way of encouraging non-highly compen-
sated employees ... to increase their elective deferrals, which in turn helps the plan
meet the actual deferral percentage [nondiscrimination] test.
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2. Individual Retirement Accounts
IRAs provide yet another example of a discretionary option for re-
tirement savings. Employees without access to qualified plans origi-
nally had no opportunity for tax-favored retirement savings. In 1974,
Congress addressed this gap in coverage by creating IRAs. 143 IRAs
allow individuals to make discretionary tax-deductible contributions
of earned income, thus allowing savings to be funded with pretax dol-
lars.1 44 Similar to qualified plans, IRA income accumulates without
current taxation, thus allowing a larger pool of capital to accumulate
for retirement. 145  Income taxes are then imposed upon
distribution.146
In their initial form, IRAs were available only to those who were
not active participants in employer-provided retirement plans. 147 In
an attempt to increase savings rates, Congress eliminated this active
participant limitation in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA). t48 However, unrestricted access to deductible IRAs proved
short-lived. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress reverted to a
143. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002(a), 88
Stat. 829, 959 (1974) (codified at l.R.C. § 408).
144. See I.R.C. § 219(a) (1994) (allowing a deduction for "qualified retirement contri-
butions").
145. See I.R.C. § 408(e)(1) (1994). See also I.R.C. § 408A(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (pre-
scribing treatment for Roth IRA in same manner as individual retirement plan).
146. See I.R.C. § 408(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
147. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986 625 (1987) [hereinafter "1986 BLUE BOOK"].
148. See id. The legislative history to ERTA states in part:
The committee has found that the present rules providing tax-favored treatment for
individual retirement savings have become too restrictive in view of recent rates of
inflation and because they do not sufficiently promote individual savings by employees
who participate in employer-sponsored plans.
The committee bill is designed to promote greater retirement security by increasing the
amount which individuals can set aside for retirement in an IRA and by extending IRA
eligibility to individuals who participate in employer-sponsored plans.
S. REP. No. 97-144, at 113 (1982). Expanding access to deductible IRA contributions signifi-
cantly impacted participation. A recent Senate Report from the Special Committee on Aging
made the following observations about the impact of ERTA:
The extension of IRAs to pension-covered workers in 1981 by ERTA resulted in dra-
matically increased IRA contributions. In 1982, the first year under ERTA, IRS data
showed 12 million IRA accounts, over four times the 1981 number. In 1983, the num-
ber of IRAs rose to 13.6 million, 15.2 million in 1984, and 16.2 million in 1985. In 1986,
contributions to IRAs totaled $38.2 billion. Congress anticipated IRA revenue losses
under ERTA of $980 million for 1982, and $1.35 billion in 1983. However, according to
Treasury Department estimates, revenue losses from IRA deductions for those years
were $4.8 billion and $10 billion, respectively. By 1986, the estimated revenue loss had
risen to $16.8 billion. Clearly, the program had become much larger than Congress
anticipated.
S. REP. No. 105-36(l), at 69 (1997).
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policy of limiting access to tax-deductible IRA contributions, allowing
only lower-income taxpayers to supplement employer-provided plans
with deductible IRA contributions. 149
The legislative history to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggests that
curtailed access to IRAs was based on several considerations, includ-
ing: (1) higher-income taxpayers, which as a group had the highest
utilization of elective IRA contributions, "would generally have saved
without regard to the tax incentives;" (2) the lower tax rates enacted
as part of the 1986 Act would "stimulate additional work effort and
saving," thus "eliminat[ing] the need for IRA deductions for higher-
income taxpayers who participate in other tax-favored retirement
plans;" and (3) greater availability of other elective plans allowed
many higher-income employees to participate in tax-favored savings,
thus reducing the need for additional options.150
Despite limiting access to deductible contributions, Congress chose
to permit nondeductible contributions to IRAs (even for those per-
sons who were ineligible because of participation in an employer-pro-
vided plan).151 A nondeductible contribution still provides future tax
benefits in the form of tax deferral on associated earnings realized
prior to distribution. This benefit remains even though the contribu-
tion does not generate a current-year tax benefit. Thus, these provi-
sions provide an incentive for supplemental retirement savings,
particularly for those who have already maximized elective contribu-
tions to other tax-favored retirement savings options.
In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,152 Congress again expanded
taxpayers' options for supplemental retirement saving through IRAs.
First, Congress allowed additional spousal IRA contributions. Under
prior law, active participation in an employer-provided retirement
plan153 was attributed from one spouse to another, which subjected
both spouses to limited eligibility for IRA contributions. 154 Beginning
149. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2411 (1986)
(codified at I.R.C. § 219(g)). As of 1999, deductible IRA contributions for an active participant
in a qualified plan are phased out beginning at adjusted gross income of $51,000 (married filing
jointly) or $31,000 (single). See I.R.C. § 219(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Special rules apply for
spouses who are not active participants, see I.R.C. § 219(g)(7) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), and for
married filing separately and living apart, see I.R.C. § 219(g)(4) (1994).
150. See 1986 BLUE BooK, supra note 147, at 626. It should be noted that the lower tax rates
enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were also short-lived, as higher marginal rates returned
in 1993. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, §13202(a) (1993).
151. See 1986 BLUE BooK, supra note 147, at 626.
152. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
153. See I.R.C. § 219(g)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining "active participant").
154. See I.R.C. § 219(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), prior to amendment by § 301(b) of Pub. L.
No. 105-34. For married couples filing joint returns, eligibility phased out between $40,000 to
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in 1998, attribution was removed, thereby allowing a spouse who is
not an active participant in an employer-provided plan to contribute
to his or her own IRA account, provided that the couple's total in-
come did not exceed $150,000.155 This change may improve the retire-
ment security of spouses (including those who do not work outside the
home), as it allows them to contribute up to $2,000 to their own
account.
1 56
The second major change in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was
the addition of another tax-favored IRA savings plan known as the
"Roth IRA.1 57 Unlike a traditional IRA, deductions are not allowed
for contributions to a Roth IRA.1 58 Tax benefits from a Roth IRA
occur after the contribution as "qualified distribution[s]. 1159 Related
earnings are exempt from income taxation. 160  Thus, the Roth IRA
allows taxpayers to realize tax benefits in later years as compared with
a traditional IRA.161
The Roth IRA allows participants to choose whether to pay income
taxes currently, with the potential to receive tax-free distributions, as
opposed to deferring current tax obligations by using the traditional
IRA. The Roth IRA also allows contributions from participants who
are above seventy and one-half years of age; a segment of society that
is barred from contributing to traditional IRAs.162  Consequently,
those who are still earning later in life have a further opportunity to
provide tax-favored saving for future retirement needs.
$50,000 of adjusted gross income, with certain additional adjustments. Starting in 1998, this
phase-out begins at $50,000, and it increases to $80,000 for 2007 and beyond. See I.R.C.
§ 219(g)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
155. See I.R.C. § 219(g)(7) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Eligibility is phased out between
$150,000 and $160,000. See id.
156. Although one might question the equity of allowing this benefit to higher-income taxpay-
ers, it should be noted that a working spouse would otherwise be entitled to tax-deferred savings
in an employer-provided plan of potentially more than $2,000, regardless of the spouse's income.
157. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302(a), 111 Stat. 788, 825 (1997) (adding new Code § 408A).
See generally Michael S. McKinney, Note, The Roth IRA - Will It Increase Savings?, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 847 (1999).
158. See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
159. See I.R.C. § 408A(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Qualification requires a five-year hold-
ing period in addition to one of the following additional criteria: (1) distribution occurs after the
holder attains age 59'h; (2) distribution to a beneficiary (or the holder's estate) on or after death;
(3) distribution on account of disability; or (4) special purpose distribution for first-time
homebuyers. See 1.R.C. § 408A(d)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
160. See I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
161. As discussed below, both types of IRA produce similar benefits if tax rates are stable.
See infra Part II.C.
162. Compare I.R.C. § 408A(c)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (permitting Roth contribution af-
ter age 70 1h) with I.R.C. § 219(d)(1) (1994) (disallowing deduction for contributions if individual
"has attained age 701h before the close of such individual's taxable year for which the contribu-
tion was made").
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IRA participation is generally discretionary, and access depends on
individual initiative to set up an appropriate account. 163 Moreover,
the usefulness of IRAs are constrained by current contribution limits
of $2,000 per individual, as compared with up to $10,000 for 401(k)
plans, and $30,000 for other qualified pensions. 164 Although IRAs
provide savings opportunities for those without access to employer-
provided plans (including the self-employed), these limited contribu-
tion amounts may be inadequate to meet the retirement savings needs
of many people, particularly if they began saving later in their working
lives.165
3. Keogh Plans and Other Options for the Self-Employed
Prior to the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of
1962,166 tax-favored retirement savings plans were available only for
employees.167 This approach favored incorporated businesses because
shareholders could be categorized as employees. However, partners
and sole proprietors were not treated as employees for this pur-
pose. 168 Congress sought to rectify this apparent disadvantage to the
163. A possible exception to individual initiative involves special provisions allowing employ-
ers to set up IRA accounts for their employees, including the Savings Incentive Match Plans for
Employees (SIMPLE) and Simplified Employee Pension. See CANAN, supra note 9, at § 4.7
(SIMPLE) and § 4.8 (SEP).
164. See I.R.C. § 219(b)(1) (1994). SIMPLE and SEP plans using IRAs created by employers
allow higher contribution limits for employees. See CANAN, supra note 9, at §§ 4.7 to 4.8.
165. Legislation has been introduced in 1999 to raise the $2,000 contribution limit. See, e.g.,
H.R. 2574, § 1103 (1999) (proposing to raise the limit to $5,000); H.R. 1379, § 23(b) (1999) (pro-
posing to raise the limit to $3,000). Another proposal would allow older workers to "catch-up"
with additional retirement contributions. See H.R. 2488, § 1221 (1999). "Catch-up" contribu-
tions may be particularly important for parents who stayed at home to raise children and were
previously unable to contribute to an IRA because of spousal participation. Although the ex-
panded spousal contributions allowed beginning in 1998 may provide relief for stay-at-home
spouses on a prospective basis, catch-up contributions would assist those returning to the
workforce who could not participate in prior years. See supra note 154.
166. See Self-Employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809
(1962).
167. See H.R. REP. No. 87-378 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 261, which states in part:
The primary reason for the bill is to give self-employed persons access to retirement
plans on a reasonably similar basis to that accorded corporate stockholder employees.
It thus corrects a discrimination in present law under which self-employed individuals
and partners are prevented from participating in retirement plans established for the
benefit of their employees although owner-managers of corporations may do so.
Id. at 262.
168. See id.
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self-employed by allowing them to contribute to qualified plans
known as "Keogh" or "H.R. 10" plans. 169
This solution proved incomplete, as lower contribution limits appli-
cable to Keogh plans left unincorporated business owners at a disad-
vantage to their corporate counterparts for many years. 170 However,
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)171
eliminated this disparity for tax years beginning after 1983 by raising
the contribution amounts for Keogh accounts and lowering the contri-
bution amounts for other qualified plans.172 Changes enacted as part
of TEFRA achieved substantial parity in the requirements applicable
to the self-employed and other qualified plans for employees.
1 73
Theoretically, current law provides self-employed business owners
with essentially the same retirement saving options as their corporate-
employee counterparts. As part of a Keogh plan, self-employed busi-
ness owners may choose to establish defined benefit contribution pen-
sion plans, defined contribution pension plans, or cash and deferred
arrangements. 17 4 In addition, most self-employed business owners
will also be eligible to adopt SIMPLE plans,175 or SEPS. 176 As shall
be discussed, these plans provide a significant advantage in accumulat-
ing wealth that can be used to provide replacement income in retire-
ment.177 However, limitations and conditions on tax-favored status
may make them an impractical option for self-employed business
owners.
C. Wealth Accumulation Advantages From Tax-Favored Treatment
Tax-favored treatment provides a significant advantage in accumu-
lating wealth for retirement. Tax deferral on contributions and their
169. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 15, at 72. Representative Keogh, who spon-
sored the bill, was a member of the Committee on Ways and Means. It was numbered H.R. 10 in
the House of Representatives. See H.R. REP. No. 87-378 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 261.
170. For example, prior to parity provisions enacted in 1982, contributions for self-employed
persons were limited to the lesser of 15 percent of income from self-employment or $15,000,
whereas contributions for employees could be up to 25 percent of compensation up to a maxi-
mum of $45,475. See Joseph S. Bluestein & Jack B. Levy, Owner Dominated Plans - Top-Heavy
and H.R. 10 Plans, 353-2d T.M. A-1. Bluestein and Levy have suggested that many businesses
incorporated solely because of the more liberal retirement savings benefits available to corpo-
rate businesses. See id.
171. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
172. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAl EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 301-02, 309-10 (1982).
173. See Bluestein & Levy, supra note 170, at A-1 to A-2; CANAN, supra note 9, at § 5.1.
174. See INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT PLANS GUIDE, supra note 113, at 1 3001.
175. See I.R.C. § 408(p)(6)(A), (B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
176. See I.R.C. § 408(k)(7)(A) (1994).
177. See infra Part II.C.
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related earnings effectively results in a tax exemption for a portion of
the account. This exemption effect can be illustrated through the fol-
lowing example. Assume that a taxpayer with $1,000 in earnings pays
the applicable federal income taxes and invests the remainder under
three different alternatives: (1) "Traditional IRA," 178 (2) "Roth
IRA," and (3) a taxable investment subject to generally applicable
timing rules (i.e., one that is not tax-favored). The taxpayer's invest-
ment return is 10 percent, and his marginal tax rate is 28 percent. As-
sume further that the initial investment and accumulated earnings are
distributed to the taxpayer after one year, and that no penalties ap-
ply.1 79 Results under each alternative are summarized below:
TRADITIONAL ROTH TAXABLE
IRA IRA ACCOUNT
Investment (after 28% tax) $1,000 $ 720 $ 720.00
10% Return on Investment 100 72 72.00
Distribution 1,100 792 792.00
Tax at Distribution (28%) 308 n/a 20.16
Available for Consumption $ 792 $ 792 $ 771.84
In this example, the Traditional IRA begins with an investment of
$1,000, which is $280 greater than the other options because it allows
investment of pre-tax dollars. The Roth IRA and the taxable account
both require investments of after-tax dollars, leaving only $720 availa-
ble for investment after payment of $280 in taxes. Although all invest-
ments earn a 10 percent return, the Traditional IRA generates a
greater total return (i.e., $100 versus $72) because of the additional
$280 investment that is attributable to tax savings from the year of
contribution. 180
The $1,100 distribution to the Traditional IRA owner reflects the
additional investment and earnings. Both IRA accounts generate
$792 in cash available for consumption after taking into account taxes
on distribution, which apply only to the Traditional IRA. In this situa-
tion, the additional $280 investment in the Traditional IRA grew to
$308, which is the total tax due after distribution. Thus, the Tradi-
tional IRA could be viewed as divided into two separate accounts; one
containing current year tax savings invested for the government, and
178. The "Traditional IRA" was used for simplicity. This alternative could also include em-
ployer-provided qualified plans or Keogh plans with similar tax features.
179. This one-year distribution assumption is a matter of computational convenience. An ad-
ditional 10 percent tax may apply to early distributions or withdrawals. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).
180). If this example had involved a multi-year investment, the Taxable Account would gener-
ate a lower return each year to the extent it had realized gains due to annual tax liabilities on
those gains.
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the other containing the balance invested for the taxpayer.18' In con-
trast, the Roth IRA satisfied its tax obligations prior to contribution,
allowing the entire balance to be invested for the taxpayer with no
further tax due at distribution.
The taxable account generates only $771.84, which is $20.16 less
than the amount obtained in the tax-favored IRAs. This difference is
attributable to the tax imposed on the $72 return from this invest-
ment, which was not imposed on the same earnings of either the Roth
or Traditional IRA.' 82 Thus, the IRAs allow a tax exemption for
earnings on the taxpayer's share of the investment, whether achieved
through deferral in the Traditional IRA or specific exemption of earn-
ings on after-tax contributions in the Roth IRA. 18 3
The potential for tax-exempt earnings is attractive, yet, even greater
benefits are available if reduced tax rates apply to future distributions.
Suppose that the taxpayer in the previous illustration was subject to a
marginal tax rate of only 15 percent in the year of distribution, instead
of the 28 percent rate in the prior year. The results of a Traditional
IRA, Roth IRA, and Taxable Account in each of these circumstances
are shown below:
TRADITIONAL ROTH TAXABLE
IRA IRA ACCOUNT
Investment (after 28% tax) $1,000 $ 720 $ 720
10% Return on Investment 100 72 72
Distribution 1,100 792 792
Tax at Distribution (15%) 165 n/a 10.80
Available for Consumption $ 935 $ 792 $ 779.20
181. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 93-94 (Rev. 8th ed. 1999).
182. $72 x .28 = $20.16. Recall, the tax due on the Traditional IRA was $308 - $280 from
prior-year tax savings plus the related earnings of $28. No tax was apparently imposed on the
$72 earned on the balance of $720 invested in this account.
183. Those favoring consumption taxation observe that the treatment of qualified retirement
plans removes a "distortion" in income taxation by eliminating a tax on returns from savings.
See Ippolito, supra note 140, at 37.
By eliminating the double tax on savings, pensions remove the distortion in the tax
code favoring spending now and saving less for retirement. By "neutralizing" the deci-
sion to save for retirement - that is, by eliminating the double-tax distortion - pension
tax policy offsets biases in the income tax system that induce workers to take shorter
retirements and to have lower standards of living during retirement.
Id. at 37; Halperin, supra note 14, at 160 ("Since there is no consensus in favor of a consumption
tax, it is, perhaps, understandable that supporters of such a change would seek indirect means of
accomplishing their goal. Expanding the special treatment for pension and profit-sharing plans
into what looks more like a general incentive for saving is one such route."); Weiss, supra note 7,
at 1289 & n.54 (noting that many economists who favor consumption taxation "defend the pen-
sion deduction because they regard it as the removal of a bad tax rather than as a subsidy, which
they would oppose.").
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The Traditional IRA would provide $935 available for consumption,
as compared with only $792 if tax rates had remained stable. 8 4 In
effect, the owner of the Traditional IRA is able to keep a portion of
prior-year tax savings and the related earnings, which would otherwise
be paid out in tax. In such circumstances, the Traditional IRA, or any
other tax-favored investment with similar characteristics, would out-
perform the Roth IRA. However, both tax-favored options out-
perform the taxable account.
If tax rates increase, rather than decrease, the characteristics of the
Traditional IRA can work against the taxpayer during the short time
frame noted above. To illustrate, suppose that the taxpayer in the
above example faced a 40 percent tax rate in the year of distribution,
rather than the 28 percent rate in the prior year. The results in this
situation are shown below:
TRADITIONAL ROTH TAXABLE
IRA IRA ACCOUNT
Investment (after 28% tax) $1,000 $ 720 $ 720
10% Return on Investment 100 72 72
Distribution 1,100 792 792
40% Tax at Distribution 440 n/a 28.80
Available for Consumption $ 720 $ 792 $ 763.20
In such circumstances, only the Roth IRA provides a better result
than a taxable account. Higher tax rates on deferred income in the
Traditional IRA eclipse the benefit from tax exemption on earnings,
thus making the taxpayer at hand worse off despite participating in a
"tax-favored" account.
Several factors make it unlikely that "tax-favored" accounts will un-
derperform taxable accounts with similar investments. First, the
above example used a one-year time frame, whereas most retirement
saving occurs over several years. Multi-year effects of compounding
tax-exempt returns can offset even dramatic increases in tax rates. To
illustrate, assume a single investment of $1,000 in a Traditional IRA,
which is compounded over twenty years with tax-exempt earnings of
10 percent per year. At the end of twenty years, this investment will
be worth $6,727.50.185 Alternatively, assume that $720 ($1,000 less
taxes of $280) is invested in a taxable account which generates an af-
ter-tax return of 7.2 percent each year.186 At the end of twenty years,
this investment will be worth $2,892.20,187 which is less than half the
184. $1,100 x .28 = $308 tax at distribution, leaving $792 available for consumption.
185. $tOOO x (1 + .10)2"= $6,727.50.
186. The after-tax rate of 7.2 percent reflects 28 percent tax imposed on annual earnings of 10
percent, which is identical to the IRA investment.
187. $720 x (1 + .072)20= $2,892.20.
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amount in the tax-favored account. Thus, even in the unlikely event
that tax rates double in the year the taxpayer takes a distribution from
the IRA, the tax-favored account remains preferable to the taxable
account. 188
Second, post-retirement income levels are typically at or below in-
come levels during working years. 189 Absent legislative efforts to in-
crease tax rates, movement to a higher tax bracket after retirement is
unlikely, unless tax-favored account balances are distributed in a taxa-
ble lump sum.t 90 If tax-favored accounts are used to provide annual
retirement income, average tax rates applicable to retirement income
are likely to be lower than the marginal rates generating tax benefits
in the year of contribution.
To illustrate, assume that in 1999 a married taxpayer has adjusted
gross income of $56,000, after taking into account an excludable (or
deductible) contribution of $10,000 to a tax-favored account. Using
the standard deduction of $7,200,191 and personal exemptions totaling
$5,500 for the couple, 192 their taxable income would total $43,300.193
The total tax due on that amount would be $6,527.50,194 for an aver-
age tax rate of 11.65 percent. 195 Since income over $43,050 is taxed at
a marginal rate of 28 percent, 196 the taxpayer would obtain a current-
year tax benefit totaling $2,800 from $10,000 of retirement savings.
Assume further that upon retirement this taxpayer fully replaces his
pre-retirement earnings (other than the $10,000 devoted to retirement
188. In this example, tax rates would have to increase to more than 57 percent before the tax-
favored account becomes disadvantaged. The after-tax value of the IRA at 57 percent tax rate is
computed as follows: $6,727.50 - ($6,727.50 x .57) = $6,727.50 - $3,834.68 = $2,892.83.
189. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Universal Pensions, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 95 (1999) ("Finan-
cial Planners usually say that an individual needs a retirement income equal to about 60 percent
to 80 percent of pre-retirement earnings."). However, a significant number of retirees are unsat-
isfied with the amount they do save. A 1998 survey by the Employee Benefits Research Institute
indicates that 20 percent of retirees have a retirement experience that is worse than expected in
terms of their overall standard of living. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Summary 1998
Retirement Confidence (visited June 9, 2000) <http://www.ebri.org/rcs/1998_results.html>.
190. Special treatment for lump sum distributions was available prior to December 31, 1999,
and to certain other pension participants who received "grandfathered" eligibility for an averag-
ing method. See generally Bob G. Kilpatrick & Dennis R. Lassila, Income Tax Strategies for
Lump Sum Distributions, 91 J. TAX'N 95 (1999).
191. Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 I.R.B. 18, at § 3.05 (listing $7,200 standard deduction for mar-
ried couples filing joint returns).
192. Id. at § 3.08 (stating that the individual personal exemption amount is $2,750 and that the
total personal exemption for a couple is $5,500) (2 x $2,750 = $5,500).
193. $56,000 - $7,100 - $5,400 = $43,500.
194. Rev. Proc. 98-61, supra note 191 at § 3.01. This figure is derived as follows: ($43,050 x
.15) + ($250 x .28) = $6,457.50 + $70 = $6,527.50.
195. $6,527.50 + $56,000 = 11.65 percent.
196. See Rev. Proc. 98-61, supra note 191, at § 3.01.
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savings) through distributions from a tax-favored retirement ac-
count. 97 Given constant tax rates and deductions, this taxpayer
would have an identical taxable income and tax liability as compared
with the prior year.19s Distributions would therefore be taxed at an
average rate of 11.65 percent which is considerably lower than the 28
percent rate at which tax benefits accrued during prior earning years.
As a result, many retirees can expect to reap tax-exempt earnings on
their own hypothetical share of the tax-favored account. 199 Addition-
ally, retirees could also expect to expand that share by lowering their
average tax rates in the year of distribution, even if nominal tax rates
remain the same.
D. Conditions and Restrictions Affecting Participation and Access
to Retirement Funds
Given these significant advantages in wealth accumulation, tax-fa-
vored accounts should be the preferred vehicle for retirement saving.
Nevertheless, tax incentives alone may be insufficient to induce volun-
tary participation in retirement savings plans. As indicated previ-
ously, voluntary participation is desirable from the perspective of
economic efficiency.200 However, current retirement security policy
operates on a more pessimistic and paternalistic assumption:
"Whether because of the long time horizon, the press of more imme-
diate needs, or the uncertainty of mortality, many people cannot or
will not provide for their own retirement security. ' '201
Based on their approaches to retirement saving, Professor Deborah
M. Weiss suggests several classifications for people including myopes,
impulsives, impatients, and deliberates.
Some people, whom I will call myopes, simply do not think very
much about the future. They spend money as they receive it. When
they retire they are forced to lower their consumption level, and
they regret not having saved more. Other people, whom I will call
impulsives, worry about providing for their old age, and continually
197. If this taxpayer also drew social security benefits, a portion of those benefits may be
excludable from taxable income. See I.R.C. § 86 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
198. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. The tax due might even be lower due to
additional standard deductions allowed to taxpayers ages 65 and over. See I.R.C. § 63(f) (1994)
(allowing additional exceptions for the aged). For 1999, this deduction amounted to $850 for
each married taxpayer aged 65 and over. See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 I.R.B. 18, § 3.05(3).
199. See supra note 179-80 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
201. Halperin, supra note 14, at 161. See also Weiss, supra note 7, at 1275 ("Left to their own
devices, many people will not save enough for their old age. This hard truth about human be-
havior has led American government to make a long and expensive commitment to retirement
security programs.").
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resolve to save more, but find that money burns a hole in their
pocket. Such people spend their paycheck the moment they receive
it. On Monday they regret the impetuousness of Friday, and prom-
ise themselves not to repeat it, yet they find next Friday that temp-
tation is again too great. Still another group, whom I will call
impatients, always believe that present consumption needs are espe-
cially pressing. Although they see the need to save for future con-
sumption, they believe that it will be easier to save from next year's
wages than from this year's. But when next year comes, current
consumption seems more pressing than it did in previous years, and
the amount that they ultimately save for retirement is far less than
what they anticipated while young .... Impatients have no cycle of
Friday binges and Monday morning regret, but rather plan con-
sciously to spend more this year than next. Finally, some people,
whom I will call deliberates, plan when young to consume less as
they grow old, and follow this consumption plan without any later
regret.20 2
As these classifications suggest, some decisions not to participate in
retirement savings plans may be irrational or misinformed, reflecting
impulsive behavior or unrealistic appraisals of current and future con-
sumption needs. These nonparticipants later regret their decisions,
much like the grasshopper.20 3 Other people choose not to save based
on realistic perceptions of current and future consumption needs. For
example, educating children or paying medical expenses may be
viewed as more important than saving for future consumption during
retirement, particularly if one believes that retirement savings can be
increased in later years.2 04
Finding a principled basis to evaluate which of these categories ap-
plies in a given period proves elusive. 20 5 Determining the appropriate
level of replacement income after retirement is a normative choice.
Thus, it is difficult to prescribe an effective policy tool that will help
only those who will have regrets. Nevertheless, employer-provided
plans apparently operate on the assumption that most people would
prefer additional retirement income (over and above Social Security
benefits) if they knew what was good for them. Conditions on tax-
202. Weiss, supra note 7, at 1285-86.
203. See discussion supra Part I.
204. It should be noted, however, that a significant increase in the savings rate may be re-
quired to match the effects of tax-deferred compounding for retirement saving done far in ad-
vance of retirement. For example, a 20 year-old who makes a one-time IRA investment of
$1,000 and allows it to compound for 45 years at a 10 percent rate of return would accumulate
$72,890 ($1,000 x (1 + .10)41) at age 65. In contrast, a 45 year-old saver making annual contribu-
tions of $1,000 with a 10 percent return would accumulate only $57,275 by age 65.
205. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 1286 (noting that economic theory assimilates all four cases to
deliberate preferences of consumption to saving).
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favored accounts are designed to encourage savings and to limit access
to that sum by those who might otherwise prefer current consumption.
1. Conditions Requiring Participation
Some conditions imposed on employer-sponsored qualified retire-
ment plans are designed to utilize other employees' attraction to tax
benefits to expand participation. 206 Nondiscrimination provisions
were first enacted in 1942 to address the concern that tax-favored re-
tirement savings opportunities should not be limited to the highly
compensated. 2°7 Minimum participation rules were enacted in con-
nection with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to supplement the nondis-
crimination rules, thus ensuring that rank and file workers were
included in retirement plans. 20 8
In the intervening years the parameters of these provisions have
varied and their desirability has been debated.20 9 Such rules may ef-
fectively force some employees to participate in employer-provided
plans, even though they might prefer to receive cash compensation
that could be used for current consumption. 210 As a result, the rules
are likely to increase the total cost of employer-provided retirement
benefits over a system of purely elective participation.211
Whatever the merits of anti-discrimination provisions in facilitating
employee participation in retirement saving, their impact on self-em-
ployed persons is unclear. On one hand, a self-employed person can
presumably control whether a plan is adopted and the extent of his or
her participation in that plan. In that sense, he or she is not "forced"
to save. However, to the extent that nondiscrimination provisions in-
crease employer costs, they may deter participation by small business
owners with a significant proportion of employees who would prefer
cash compensation rather than retirement saving. In this sense, the
206. See generally I.R.C. § 401 (a)(4) (1994) (addressing nondiscrimination generally); I.R.C.
§ 410(b) (1994) (addressing minimum coverage standards).
207. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIrS LAW, supra note 15, at 71-72. Professor Bankman points out
that discrimination concerns were originally raised in hearings in 1937, but the nondiscrimination
rules were not enacted at that time. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 800-02.
208. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 803-04 & n.71.
209. See, e.g., id. at 803; Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrim-
ination, Integration, and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 433, 433-83 (1987);
Halperin, supra note 14, at 173-75; Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement
Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 419-71 (1984); Graf,
supra note 139, at 569-72 (discussing legislative changes to nondiscrimination rules).
210. See Bankman, supra note 12, at 806-12.
211. Id. at 814 ("Under most plausible assumptions, the interference in the compensation mix
[of' nondiscrimination provisions] reduces the value of the wage package to the employee and
increases labor costs to the employer.").
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small business owner's form of saving may be affected by the savings
preferences of his or her employees.
2. Restrictions on Access to Retirement Savings
Once participation is secured, other conditions limit access to sav-
ings prior to retirement. These conditions vary depending upon the
type of plan. Qualified pension plans must limit distributions to the
following circumstances: (1) death; (2) retirement; (3) separation
from service; or (4) disability.212 Plans that permit distributions at
other times jeopardize their tax-favored status.213
Other retirement plans are more flexible. However, they still im-
pose conditions that limit access to retirement funds. CODAs estab-
lished under section 401(k), that are not also pre-ERISA money-
purchase plans,2 1 4 may allow for distributions in the case of "hard-
ship. ' 215 "Hardship" is defined narrowly, requiring an "immediate
and heavy financial need, ' 216 as illustrated through following example.
Generally, for example, the need to pay the funeral expenses of a
family member would constitute an immediate and heavy financial
need. A distribution made to an employee for the purchase of a
boat or television would generally not constitute a distribution
made on account of an immediate and heavy financial need. 217
Regulations also state particular circumstances that are deemed satis-
factory in meeting the "immediate and heavy financial need" require-
ment, including needs arising from certain medical expenses, costs
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1976). These conditions are rooted in the
definition of a pension plan, which is a plan:
established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically for the
payment of definitely determinable benefits to his employees over a period of years,
usually for life, after retirement .... A pension plan may provide for the payment of a
pension due to disability and may also provide for the payment of incidental death
benefits through insurance or otherwise. However, a plan is not a pension plan if it
provides for the payment of benefits not customarily included in a pension plan such as
layoff benefits or benefits for sickness, accident, hospitalization, or medical expenses
(except medical benefits described in section 401(h) as defined in paragraph (a) of
§ 1.401-14).
Id.
213. See Rev. Rul. 74-254, 1974-1 C.B. 91 (denying tax-favored status to pension plan allowing
distribution upon condition not described above).
214. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(6) (1994) (defining pre-ERISA money purchase plan).
215. See I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(2)(B) (1994) (listing events that allow for distribution of trusts to
participants and beneficiaries); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995) (allowing
for distribution of a profit sharing or stock bonus plan in the case of employee hardship).
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1995).
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incurred to purchase a principal residence or in preventing eviction
from that residence, and certain tuition and educational expenses. 218
In addition to satisfying the financial need requirement, the distrib-
utable amount is limited to that which is "necessary to satisfy the fi-
nancial need. '219 This generally requires a written representation
from the employee that the need cannot reasonably be relieved
through other personal resources, such as loans, or ceasing employee
contributions under the plan.221 A hardship distribution should ap-
parently be used as a last resort, as opposed to a routine method of
accessing funds.
Premature distributions from other qualified retirement plans and
individual retirement accounts are generally allowed. Such distribu-
tions, however, are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.221 In the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Congress expanded the scope of this excise tax in
order to prevent the diversion of retirement savings to non-retirement
uses. 222 However, the significance of the excise tax depends, in part,
on the amount of tax-free buildup in the account. If an account has
significant accumulated earnings, the participant is likely to benefit
from tax savings despite the excise tax.223 For this reason, some com-
mentators have suggested that penalties should be restructured to
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(2)(iv) (as amended in 1995).
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(1)(2)(iii)(B) (as amended in 1995).
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2)(iii)(B) (as amended in 1995). The employer's responsibil-
ity is limited to obtaining the employee's representation, unless the employer has actual knowl-
edge that it is false. Id.
221. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (imposing a 10 percent additional tax on early
distribution from qualified retirement plans).
222. See 1986 BLUE BooK, supra note 147, at 713-14. Some special rules may also apply. For
example, SIMPLE plan distributions within the two-year period after the employee begins par-
ticipation are subject to a 25 percent tax, rather than a 10 percent tax, as an additional disincen-
tive for withdrawal. I.R.C. § 72(t(6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (allowing special rules for
SIMPLE retirement accounts). Roth IRAs are also subject to a five-year limitation on with-
drawals, even if the distribution occurs after age 5916. I.R.C. § 408A(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(stating distribution rates).
223. For example, consider the twenty year IRA which accumulated $6,727.50 as compared
with only $2,892.20 in a taxable account. See supra note 183. Even if the tax rate at distribution
was 40 percent and a 10 percent excise tax applied, the IRA participant would still have
$3.363.75 ($6,727.50 x .50), and would thus be better off than having not participated in a tax-
favored account. See also CANAN, supra note 9, at §4.5[4] ("Assuming a 10 percent interest rate,
an individual in the 25 percent tax bracket would have to accumulate an IRA for almost seven
years before reaching the break-even point."); S. REi,. No. 105-36(l), supra note 148, at 70
("Most analysts agree that the additional buildup of earnings in the IRA, which occurs because
the earnings are not taxed, will surpass the value of the 10 percent penalty after only a few years,
depending upon the interest earned. Some advertising for IRA savings emphasized the weak-
ness of the penalty and promoted IRAs as short-term tax shelters.").
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take into account more appropriate disincentives for premature with-
drawals from retirement plans.224
Congress recently reduced the impact of this penalty excise on pre-
mature withdrawals by adding exceptions for certain targeted activi-
ties. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997225 allows taxpayers to make
distributions from "qualified retirement plans" 226 for certain medical
expenses, without incurring the applicable penalty tax.227 The Act
also allows penalty-free distributions from "individual retirement
plans ' 228 to pay health insurance premiums during a period of unem-
ployment, 229 "qualified higher education expenses" of the taxpayer,
the taxpayer's spouse, or any child or grandchild of the taxpayer or
spouse, 230 and "qualified first-time homebuyer" costs. 231
Arguably, the exceptions for home buying and medical expenses
have a complementary relationship to achieving retirement security.
Purchasing a home could be considered another form of retirement
savings because home ownership may reduce the amount of replace-
ment income required to sustain a retiree's standard of living.232 Med-
ical expenses also relate to retirement security to the extent that they
are necessary to reach retirement age, or to enjoy healthy living dur-
ing retirement. However, the relationship between education ex-
penses and retirement is more tenuous. 233
224. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 1283 n.31.
225. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997) (codified, as amended, in various sections of 26
U.S.C.).
226. "Qualified retirement plans" are defined in I.R.C. § 4974(c) (1994) to include both em-
ployer-provided qualified plans described in section 401(a) as well as IRAs. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(1)
(1994).
227. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
228. An "individual retirement plan" is defined as either "an individual retirement account
described in section 408(a) [or] ... an individual retirement annuity described in section 408(b)."
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(37) (1994). Thus, employer-provided qualified plans are excluded.
229. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(D) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
230. I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(2)(E), 72(t)(7) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
231. I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(2)(F), 72(t)(8) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
232. Moreover, home ownership is also highly tax-favored, given the combination of deducti-
ble mortgage interest, I.R.C. § 163 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), an exemption for capital gains on the
sale of a principal residence, I.R.C. § 121 (Supp. IV 1998), and an exemption from taxation on
imputed income from personal use.
233. To the extent that education contributes to the economic security of children, it arguably
expands the safety net associated with family commitments. However, allowing existing IRA
balances to be used for education also raises equitable concerns, as those who chose to save for
education outside of an IRA were not able to reap the benefit of tax-deferred savings. The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 also contained other tax benefits for education, including the Hope
Scholarship Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and Education IRAs. See I.R.S. Notice 97-60,
1997-2 C.B. 310. An IRA distribution could be used to cover "qualified tuition and related
expenses" and those expenditures are apparently eligible for either Hope Scholarship or Life-
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Although access to funds prior to retirement might jeopardize fu-
ture retirement security in a particular case, such flexibility may also
remove a potential barrier to participation. Lower-income taxpayers
with few resources available to draw upon during a crisis may be dis-
couraged from contributing to a retirement saving plan to the extent
that they believe their funds will be unavailable in a time of need, or
can be accessed only at significant cost.2 34 Thus, these provisions may
ultimately enhance participation and retirement security for some
taxpayers.
Loan provisions in retirement plans are also designed to address
concerns about the potential need to access retirement funds.235
However, loans from IRAs are prohibited transactions causing a loss
of tax-exempt status. 236 Pledging an IRA as security for a loan also
causes a taxable distribution in the amount pledged.237 Thus, the cur-
rent rules for IRAs have the anomalous effect of allowing distribu-
tions that permanently deplete retirement savings without any means
time Learning Credits. See id. at 317-18. Thus, the IRA deferral can be effectively made perma-
nent through these benefits.
234. Cf. S. REP. 97-494, at 319-20 (1982).
The committee is concerned that widespread use of loans from tax-qualified plans and
tax-sheltered annuities diminishes retirement savings. Accordingly, the committee con-
cluded that restrictions on loans and pledges should be applied to all plan participants.
However, the committee is also concerned that an absolute prohibition against loans
might discourage retirement savings by rank-and-file employees who may need access to
such monies for emergencies. Thus, the committee believes it appropriate to permit
smaller loans which will not substantially diminish an employee's retirement savings.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Halperin, supra note 14, at 180 ("Low and moderate earners may
have to be assured that if they need funds for unforeseen emergencies, they will at the least be
no worse off than if they had not entered the plan in the first place."); Graetz, supra note 6, at
893 ("[The risks of long-term savings limited to retirement seem to bear disproportionately on
low- and moderate-income workers who may be most concerned about access to such assets in
times of emergency.").
235. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 180. Empirical evidence supports the proposition that
loans increase the participation rate. See VanDerhei, supra note 122, at 6 n.6 ("Plans that make
loans available ... have a higher proportion of employees participating in the plan, and partici-
pants in such plans contribute an average of 35 percent more to their accounts than participants
in plans with no loan availability.").
236. See I.R.C. § 408(e)(2)(A) (1994) (prescribing loss of exemption for prohibited transac-
tion, which includes loan to participant). See also I.R.C. § 72(p)(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(omitting individual retirement accounts from the term "qualified employer plan" covered by
above rules exempting loan transactions from being treated as taxable distributions); I.R.C.
§ 4975(f)(6)(B)(i)(II) (Supp. IV 1998) (treating participant or beneficiary of individual retire-
ment plan as shareholder-employee precluded from obtaining loan from plan). Similar rules
prohibit loans from accumulated deductible contributions in a qualified plan. See I.R.C. § 72(o)
(1994).
237. See I.R.C. § 408(e)(4) (1994). In contrast, labor regulations allow up to 50 percent of the
participant's nonforfeitable accrued benefit in an employer-provided plan to be pledged as se-
curity for a loan from the plan. See 29 C.F.R. 2550.408b-l(f) (1999).
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to restore those amounts, while restricting loans that may only tempo-
rarily deplete retirement savings until repayment occurs. This effect
may be viewed as a disadvantage for those who choose IRAs as their
primary savings vehicle instead of employer-provided plans with loan
provisions.
Qualified retirement plans other than IRAs are generally permitted
to make loans to participants or beneficiaries if the loan:
(A) is available to all such participants or beneficiaries on a reason-
ably equivalent basis,
(B) is not made available to highly compensated employees (within
the meaning of section 414(q)) in an amount greater than the
amount made available to other employees,
(C) is made in accordance with specific provisions regarding such
loans set forth in the plan,
(D) bears a reasonable rate of interest, and
(E) is adequately secured.238
Additional limitations apply in order to prevent a loan, which other-
wise satisfies these conditions, from being treated as a taxable distri-
bution. Section 72(p) of the Code provides that an otherwise
permissible loan 239 will not be treated as a constructive distribution
"to the extent that such loan . . does not exceed the lesser of-(i)
$50,000 ... or (ii) the greater of (I) one-half of the present value of
the nonforfeitable accrued benefit of the employee under the plan, or
(II) $10,000. '' 240 This provision imposes a cap of $50,000 on outstand-
ing loans for participants with nonforfeitable accrued benefits of more
than $100,000. However, the provision allows a person with nonfor-
feitable accrued benefits of only $15,000 to borrow at least $10,000.241
These loans must also comply with certain terms, including repayment
within five years (unless the loan is used to acquire the participant's
principal residence) 242 and "substantially level amortization" over the
term of the loan. 243
Additional rules governing prohibited transactions do not allow
plan loans to certain "disqualified persons,"244 including an "owner-
238. I.R.C. § 4975(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (con-
taining similar provisions under ERISA).
239. A loan may be treated as a taxable distribution under section 72(p) without jeopardizing
the tax-qualified status of the plan. See CANAN, supra note 9, at § 3.15[B][1] n.18.
240. I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(A) (1994).
241. See CANAN, supra note 9, at § 3.15[B]. Special rules apply to plans with outstanding
loans which affect the amount of new loans that can be made. Id.
242. See I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(B) (1994).
243. I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(C) (1994).
244. I.R.C. § 4975(a) (Supp. IV 1998). The Code imposes an excise tax of 15 percent on a
disqualified person with respect to a "prohibited transaction." Id. A "prohibited transaction"
includes "lending of money or extension of credit between a plan and a disqualified person."
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employee," his or her family members, and certain related entities.2 45
For this purpose, an "owner-employee" is defined as "an employee
who - (A) owns the entire interest in an unincorporated trade or
business, or (B) in the case of a partnership, is a partner who owns
more than 10 percent of either the capital interest or the profits inter-
est in such partnership. ' 246 In addition, an "owner-employee" in-
cludes a "shareholder-employee, ' 247 which means "an employee or
officer of an S corporation who owns (or is considered as owning
within the meaning of section 318(a)(1)), more than 5 percent of the
outstanding stock of the corporation on any day during the taxable
year of such corporation. '2 48
Congress has recognized that "rank and file" employees need access
to retirement funds in emergencies. 249 However, the applicable rules
do not restrict access based on annual income levels. Instead, the
rules restrict only the size of plan loans, reflecting the view that
"smaller loans" permitted by section 72(p) "will not substantially di-
minish an employee's retirement savings. ' 250 Although self-employed
small business owners may earn modest incomes similar to "rank and
file" employees, and may have the same need to access retirement
funds on a temporary basis, the prohibited transaction rules neverthe-
less prevent self-employed business owners from accessing retirement
savings through loans. To the extent that a small business requires
additional investment to deal with a financial crisis or expanding
needs, the inability to access retirement funds through borrowing may
erect an additional barrier to participation.
3. Restrictions on Investments
Given their advantage in wealth accumulation, people who are dis-
posed toward retirement saving should ordinarily choose a tax-fa-
vored retirement vehicle to hold their investments.25' Tax-favored
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B) (1994). If the prohibited transaction is not corrected, a tax of 100 percent
of the amount involved is imposed on the disqualified person. I.R.C. § 4975(b) (1994). Al-
though certain loans are exempted from this tax on prohibited transactions, see I.R.C. § 4975(d)
(Supp. IV 1998), others are specifically excluded from this exemption. See I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6)
(Supp. IV 1998).
245. I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
246. I.R.C. § 401(c)(3) (1994). Here, an "employee" includes a self-employed person. I.R.C.
§ 401(c)(1) (1994). Family members include only brothers and sisters, a spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendants. See I.R.C. § 267(c)(4) (1994).
247. I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6)(B) (Supp. IV 1998).
248. I.R.C. § 4975(f)(6)(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
249. See supra note 234.
250. See supra note 234.
251. See supra Part Il.C.
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vehicles are subject to certain restrictions, including fiduciary obliga-
tions and prohibited transaction rules, which can affect the available
investment choices. These restrictions generally pose no problem for
investors choosing publicly traded securities, mutual funds, certificates
of deposit, or similar investments. However, they raise virtually insur-
mountable barriers for the self-employed business owner who would
prefer to invest in his or her own business.
ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on trustees of "employee benefit
plans," 252 which include four general obligations: (1) loyalty to par-
ticipants and their beneficiaries, 253 (2) prudence in the conduct of plan
business and investment activities, 254 (3) diversification of plan invest-
ments, unless "it is clearly prudent not to do so, '' 255 and (4) following
plan documents when not inconsistent with ERISA requirements. 256
Fiduciaries responsible for investing plan assets may be held responsi-
ble for losses if they are found to violate their duties of prudence or
diversification. 257
Pension plans that provide for individual accounts and allow partici-
pants or beneficiaries to exercise control over the investment of their
pension assets may limit the extent of those fiduciary responsibili-
ties.258 However, participant-directed investment may not free a fidu-
ciary from ensuring access to an appropriate range of investment
alternatives and appropriate information about those alternatives. 259
Further, the fiduciary is generally not excused from responsibility for
losses if the fiduciary acquiesces in making certain investments. 260
Those investments which would expose a fiduciary to liability, even if
directed by the participant, include loans to the plan sponsor,26' acqui-
252. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994) (defining coverage of provisions imposing fiduciary re-
sponsibilities); § 1104(a) (1994) (imposing "prudent man standard of care").
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring discharge of duties "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and ... for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to
participants and . . . defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.").
254. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994) (requiring that the plan be conducted "with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims.").
255. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (1994).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1994).
257. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994).
258. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
259. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b) (1999).
260. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (1999).
261. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(ii)(E)(2) (1999).
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sition or sale of employer real property,262 and acquisition or sale of
employer securities (except for certain publicly traded securities). 263
The fiduciary obligations under ERISA are applicable to employer-
provided qualified plans. The obligations are not applicable to Keogh
plans unless employees other than a self-employed business owner
participate in the plan.264 Additionally, the obligations do not apply
to IRAs where participation is voluntary and the employer does not
make contributions. 265 However, an exception from the scope of ER-
ISA's fiduciary obligations does not mean that a self-employed par-
ticipant in a Keogh plan or an IRA has free choice in investments.
The prohibited transaction rules in section 4975 of the Code that pre-
vent loans also preclude other types of investment in the participant's
business. 266 Violation of these rules can result in excise tax liability for
the participant of 15 percent of the amount involved, up to 100 per-
cent if the prohibited transaction is not corrected promptly. 267 An
IRA investment that violates section 4975 causes the IRA to lose its
tax exemption. 268
Thus, IRAs, Keogh plans, and other qualified plans can accommo-
date a broad range of investments within the parameters of the pro-
hibited transaction rules and the applicable fiduciary obligations
imposed by ERISA. However, the plans cannot accommodate busi-
ness capital formation needs of the entrepreneur. Even though a self-
employed business owner may prefer saving and investment to con-
sumption, the inaccessibility of tax-favored retirement savings for bus-
iness needs may inhibit participation.
III. EMPIRICAL DATA ON PARTICIPATION
The above discussion identified conditions that inhibit a small busi-
ness owner's participation in tax-favored retirement savings, including
restrictions on business investment and access to retirement funds.
Empirical studies of workers at small business firms provide indirect
262. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(ii)(E)(3) (1999).
263. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4) (1999).
264. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (1999). Spouses of owners are also excluded from the defini-
tion of an employee for purposes of this provision. Id.
265. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (1999).
266. See I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1) (1994). A prohibited transaction includes "sale or exchange, or
leasing, of any property between a plan and a disqualified person" and "transfer to, or use by, or
for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets of a plan" among the list of
prohibited transactions. Although exemptions are available in some circumstances, such exemp-
tions are not available to owner-employees. See I.R.C. §§ 4975(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), 4975
(f)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
267. See I.R.C. §§ 4975(a) (Supp. IV 1998), 4975(b) (1994).
268. See I.R.C. § 408(e)(2) (1994).
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evidence that the owners of such businesses are not participating, and
that capital scarcity is probably an important reason behind their non-
participation.269 Analysis of IRS Statistics of Income data for the 1997
tax year provides additional evidence that many self-employed per-
sons do not participate in tax-favored retirement savings.270
A. Employee Benefits Research Institute Surveys
Workers at small firms are much less likely to be covered by an
employer-sponsored retirement plan than workers in larger firms.271
Data from the Current Population Survey for 1997 indicates the fol-
lowing breakdown of access and participation for workers employed
by firms of various sizes:
TABLE 1: PENSION PLAN COVERAGE OF WORKERS BASED ON
EMPLOYER SIZE
2 7 2
Workers
with
Employer- Workers
Offered Included in
Pension % of Pension % of
Firm Size Workers % of Total Plan Workers Plan Workers
Under 25 42394 29.32% 8222 19.39% 6030 14.22%
25-99 18374 12.71% 8724 47.48% 6583 35.83%
100-499 19051 13.18% 12110 63.57% 9327 48.96%
500-999 8091 5.60% 55975 73.85% 4674 57.77%
1000 or more 56671 39.20% 43784 77.26% 34097 60.17%
Total Workers 144581 100.00% 78815 54.51% 60711 41.99%
This data shows that more than 42 million workers are employed by
firms with fewer than 25 workers, which represents nearly 30 percent
of the total workforce. Only about 19 percent of these workers had
employers who offered pension plans, and of the 19 percent, only
about 14 percent participated in those plans. Firms with 25-99 work-
ers fared slightly better. Both of these groups show participation
levels significantly below those of larger firms.273
269. See infra part M.A.
270. See infra part III.B.
271. See Paul Yakoboski & Pamela Ostuw, Small Employers and the Challenge of Sponsoring
a Retirement Plan: Results of the 1998 Small Employer Retirement Survey, EBRI IssuE BRIEF
No. 202, 3 (October 1998).
272. Current Population Survey (A Joint Project Between the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
the Bureau of the Census) Pension plan coverage of workers, by Selected Characteristics ....
1997 (All Races, Both Sexes), at Table NC8 (visited June 8, 2000) <http://ferret.bls.census.gov/
macro/031998Inoncash/8_001.htm> [hereinafter CPS Table NC8 (1997)].
273. Yakoboki and Ostuw derive similar disparities from 1993 data. See Yakoboski & Ostuw,
supra note 271.
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In an attempt to evaluate the basis for this disparity in coverage, the
Employee Benefits Research Institute recently conducted surveys
"designed to gauge the views and attitudes of America's small em-
ployers (with 5 to 100 full-time workers) regarding retirement plans
and related issues. '274 Although these surveys exclude the smallest
employers, and self-employed persons who have no employees, they
may nevertheless provide insight into the motivations and concerns
affecting retirement saving plans by small business owners.275
According to EBRI's 1999 survey, 19 percent of respondents who
did not offer retirement plans indicated that their "most important"
reason for not offering a retirement plan benefit was that "revenue is
too uncertain to commit to a plan;" 50 percent agreed that this was a
"major" reason they did not offer a retirement plan. 276 Other reasons
for not offering a plan included the following: "A large portion of
workers are seasonal, part time, or high turnover" (19 percent "most
important," 42 percent "major"); "Employees prefer wages and/or
other benefits" (17 percent "most important," 53 percent "major");
"It costs too much to set up and administer" (12 percent "most impor-
tant," 30 percent "major"); and "Required company contributions are
too expensive" (10 percent "most important," 51 percent "major"). 277
A similar survey in 1998 showed comparable results, confirming that
employee preferences, uncertain revenue, high administrative costs,
and the expense of required company contributions topped the list as
reasons for opting out of any offer to set up a retirement plan.278
Administrative costs and burdens have long been considered barri-
ers to participation. Consequently, Congress has periodically sought
to address these concerns for smaller employers. 279 These responses
indicate that even reduced administrative burdens may not be enough
to induce participation. As some commentators have pointed out,
274. See EBRI, The 1999 Small Employer Retirement Survey (SERS) Summary of Findings,
at 6 (visited June 8, 2000) <http://www.ebri.org./sers/1999/serssummary.pdf> [hereinafter 1999
SERS Summary]. The 100 employee maximum for a "small employer" follows the criteria for
SIMPLE plans eligibility under I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(C)(i)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). See Yakoboski &
Ostuw, supra note 271 (discussing survey results for 1998, the first year of this survey).
275. The survey was conducted through fifteen minute telephone interviews with 301 compa-
nies with a retirement plan and 301 companies without a retirement plan. See EBRI, the 1999
SERS Summary, supra note, 274 at 6. The authors state that "each sample should yield statisti-
cal precision of plus or minus six percentage points (with 95 percent certainty) of what the result
would be if all businesses with five to 100 full-time workers were surveyed with complete accu-
racy.' Id.
276. Id. at 2.
277. Id.
278. Yakoboski & Ostuw, supra note 271, at 7.
279. See id. at 3-4. SEPs and SIMPLE plans are examples of these efforts toward reducing
administrative burdens. See id.
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"while administrative issues matter, they are not the only factors in-
volved in low plan sponsorship among small employers: lack of em-
ployee demand for retirement plans and uncertain revenue streams
are equally important. '280 These commentators dismiss the overall in-
dication of a lack of employee demand as a function of the type of
workers who are typically employed by small businesses without re-
tirement plans. Typically, the employees are "young, have relatively
low earnings, have lower levels of education, and turn over more
quickly - characteristics not associated with high demand for retire-
ment savings."'2 81 However, the commentators point out that among
employers with retirement plans, only 53 percent of such employers
have retirement savings education programs. 28 2 Thus, educational ef-
forts may improve retirement savings demands among some employee
groups.
Nevertheless, the significant concern about "uncertain revenue
streams" suggests that financial ability to contribute is a limiting factor
regardless of employee demand.28 3 When asked what changes would
lead the employer to seriously consider offering a retirement plan,
nearly two-thirds chose "increased company profits. ' 284 This particu-
lar response exceeded the following responses for a business tax
credit: sponsoring a plan (64 percent); reduced administrative require-
ments (50 percent); demand from employees (49 percent); allowing
key executives to save more in the plan (49 percent); and lengthening
vesting requirements for employees (40 percent). 285
To some extent, the revenue concern may reflect a misunderstand-
ing of retirement savings options. For example, only 64 percent of
small employers without a plan knew that a plan could be set up for
less than $2000, only 60 percent knew that administrative costs could
be shared with employees, and only 55 percent knew that an employer
was not legally obligated to match all employee 401(k) contribu-
tions. 286 A significant percentage of employers were either mis-
informed or uninformed about the nature of employer obligations,
resulting in a possible overstatement of the perceptions of cost. 28 7
However, to the extent that matching contributions may be necessary
280. See id. at 5.
281. Id. at 6.
282. See id. at 12.
283. See Yakoboski & Ostuw, supra note 271, at 12.
284. See id. at 8.
285. See id. at 8-9.
286. See id. at 8.
287. See id.
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either as a statutory requirement 288 or as a means to ensure adequate
employee participation,2 89 this cost sensitivity is not unfounded.
Although a small business employer could potentially limit out-of-
pocket costs for employees by adopting a plan that relies on discre-
tionary employee contributions, the stated concern about limited prof-
its and uncertain revenues may also affect the owner's willingness to
make contributions for his or her own account. If funds are needed to
ensure that the business is able to meet its payroll, pay its debts, or
expand, the owner may be unwilling or unable to participate.290 An
employer's own inability to use a tax-favored account is likely to influ-
ence a decision not to make such a plan available to employees.
Although these surveys do not directly address the preferences and
concerns of the self-employed small business owner with respect to his
or her own retirement savings, the fact that workers are not covered
suggests that their employers are also not covered. As stated earlier,
access to Keogh plans, SEPs, SIMPLEs, or other qualified retirement
plans are subject to conditions that are designed to include "rank and
file" employees.2 9' Small business owners (or their employees) could
independently contribute to IRAs. Generally, owners could not take
advantage of more generous contribution levels in other retirement
savings alternatives unless employees were also eligible to participate.
B. Statistics of Income Data
Tax return data provides an alternative source of information about
small business owners' participation in Keogh, SEP, and SIMPLE
plans. Statistics of income data compiled by the Internal Revenue
Service for the 1997 tax year provides a basis to assess participation in
these plans by self-employed business owners. 292 Although this data
is subject to several constraints, it appears consistent with the conclu-
288. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1998) (allowing employers to match contri-
butions to SIMPLE retirement accounts); I.R.C. § 408(p)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1998) (allowing
employer alternative nonelective contribution for SIMPLE plans); I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(11)-(12)
(Supp. IV 1998) (allowing employer match or alternative nonelective contributions as alternative
methods to meet nondiscrimination requirements for 401(k) plans).
289. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 28.
291. See supra notes 208-10; 1 CANAN, supra note 9, at § 5.7 (minimum benefits or contribu-
tions under "top-heavy" limitations of I.R.C. § 416 for qualified plans); id. at § 4.8[A] (required
contributions and participation in SEP); id. at § 4.9[B][2] (required employer match or contribu-
tion for SIMPLE).
292. Statistics of Income data are available online. See Therese Cruciano, Individual Income
Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 1999 (visited June 15, 1999) <http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/
taxstats/soi/ind_gss.html>, in file 971NPREL.EXE.
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sion that many small business owners, like their employee counter-
parts, are not participating in such plans.
Table 1 summarizes key data for 1997 from Form 1040 returns con-
taining either Schedule C (Profit or Loss From Business (Sole Propri-
etorship)) or Schedule F (Profit or Loss from Farming). This data
includes aggregate figures for the returns filed, income reported for all
returns, and stratified data based on the reported size of adjusted
gross income on that return.
Table 1 indicates that taxpayers filed 19,061,224 returns with Sched-
ule C, Schedule F, or both, for the 1997 tax year,293 suggesting that
there were at least 19,061,224 businesses or farming operations in the
form of sole proprietorships. Of this total, 13,390,341 returns reported
taxable income on either Schedule C, Schedule F, or both, making
them potentially eligible to participate in Keogh plan for self-em-
ployed persons. Contributions to such plans would be reported on
Line 29 of Form 1040.294
Only 1,169,016 returns, or 6.13 percent, included Keogh plan contri-
butions, for an average of $8,400 per return. However, the indicated
participation rate varies considerably when returns are stratified
based on adjusted gross income levels. Not surprisingly, those persons
in higher income strata contribute more and participate in greater per-
centages than those in lower income strata.
Although these figures provide some insight into participation by
small business owners, they do not precisely reflect participation. On
one hand, the figures may understate actual participation in tax-fa-
vored retirement savings by this group to the extent that some taxpay-
ers with self-employment income may also be employees who are
covered by an employer-provided plan. 295 For example, an employee
who participates in an employer-provided plan may also own a small
293. The figures presented are derived by the IRS through sampling. See Cruciano, Individual
Income Tax Returns, supra note 292.
294. See instructions to Schedules C and F (1997), which direct that owner contributions are
to be reported on Form 1040, line 28 (1997). On 1998 forms, the direct owner contributions are
reported on line 29 of Form 1040.
295. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(b)(3)(ii) (1963), which provides:
An individual may be treated as an employee within the meaning of section 401 (c)(1)
of one employer even though such individual is also a common-law employee of an-
other employer. For example, an attorney who is a common-law employee of a corpo-
ration and who, in the evenings maintains an office in which he practices law as a self-
employed individual is an employee within the meaning of section 401 (c)(1) with re-
spect to the law practice. This example would not be altered by the fact that the corpo-
ration maintained a qualified plan under which the attorney is benefited as a common-
law employee.
Id. See also Pulver v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 644, 650 (1982) (allowing Keogh contri-
bution for royalty income by inventor who was also covered by employer-provided pension).
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business or a farm that provides income from self-employment. Non-
participation in a Keogh plan would be reflected in the above statis-
tics, but it would not necessarily mean that the employee failed to
receive the benefit of tax-favored saving through an employer-pro-
vided plan.
On the other hand, limiting the potential pool of participants to
those filing Schedule C or Schedule F may also tend to overstate ac-
tual participation rates by self-employed persons. The "Keogh deduc-
tion" figures in the table above include contributions by partners296
eligible to contribute to a Keogh, SEP, or SIMPLE plans for a self-
employed person.297 Such contributions are reflected on line 29 of
Form 1040, in the same manner as contributions by a sole proprie-
tor;298 therefore, they would be included in the total contribution
296. The status of members of Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) are unclear under current
law. On one hand, the default classification rule for LLCs provides for partnership taxation. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (as amended in 1998) (providing partnership classification as default
rule). A partner's distributive share of partnership income may be considered income from self-
employment. I.R.C. § 1402(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). However, the status of a limited part-
ner's distributive share is uncertain. Proposed regulations defining a limited partner for self-
employment tax purposes have not been implemented. See Definition of Limited Partner for
Self-Employment Tax Purposes, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(proposed Jan. 13, 1997); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 935, 111 Stat. 788,
882 (1997). Self-employment income must also be classified as "earned income" in order to be
eligible for contribution. See I.R.C. § 401(c)(2)(A)(i) (1994) (defining "earned income" as in-
cluding "earnings from self-employment" determined "only with respect to a trade or business
in which personal services of the taxpayer are a material income-producing factor").
297. See I.R.C. § 401(d) (Supp. IV 1998). providing in part, that "contributions on behalf of
any owner-employee may be made only with respect to the earned income of such owner-em-
ployee which is derived from the trade or business with respect to which such plan is estab-
lished." I.R.C. § 401(c)(3) (1994) defines an owner-employee to include "an employee who -
(A) owns the entire interest in an unincorporated trade or business, or (B) in the case of a
partnership, is a partner who owns more than 10 percent of either the capital interest or the
profits interest in such partnership." An "employee" for this purpose includes a "self-employed
individual." I.R.C. § 401(c)(1)(A) (1994). The partnership is considered the employer of its
partners, and thus only the partnership can establish a qualified plan for its partners, even
though they are "self-employed." See I.R.C. § 401(c)(4) (1994) ("A partnership shall be treated
as the employer of each partner who is an employee within the meaning of paragraph
[401(c)](1)"); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(e)(1) (1963) ("[A]n individual partner is not an employer
who may establish a qualified plan with respect to his services to the partnership."). It should be
noted that S-Corporation shareholders are not eligible to make Keogh contributions, even
though they perform substantial services for the S-Corporation. See Durando v. United States,
70 F.3d 548, 1551 (9th Cir. 1995); No Go for Keogh Funded With S Corp. Income, 24 TAX'N LAW.
305, 305-06 (1996). However, an S-Corporation may set up retirement plans that include share-
holder-employees. Id. at 306. Thus, benefits for S-Corporation shareholder-employees would
not be reflected in these statistics. Id.
298. See instructions for Line 11 on Schedule K-I (1997). The instructions state that this line
includes: "Payments made on your behalf to an IRA, Keogh, simplified employee pension (SEP)
or a SIMPLE plan.... Enter payments made to a Keogh, SEP, or SIMPLE plan on Form 1040,
line 29."
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amounts. Unless eligible partners also had sole proprietorships, their
returns would not be counted in the total number of returns filed with
Schedules C or F.
In 1997, 5,662,317 returns had income or loss from partnerships or S
Corporations, with 3,599,488 of these returns reporting income. 299
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine how many taxpayers filing
these returns would have been eligible to make Keogh, SEP, or SIM-
PLE contributions. However, to the extent that any of these returns
include eligible partners, they would tend to reduce the overall per-
centage of participation in Keogh, SEP, and SIMPLE saving plans.
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF BUSINESS INVESTMENTS
AND DISPOSITIONS
Although it would be desirable to have more empirical data specifi-
cally focused on retirement saving practices of small business owners,
the data discussed herein suggests that a significant number do not
participate in tax-favored savings. Capital formation needs, coupled
with disadvantageous rules concerning access to retirement savings
prior to retirement, help to explain this nonparticipation. One may
also question whether business investments provide comparable tax
benefits that diminish or eliminate any perceived disadvantage from
nonparticipation in tax-favored retirement vehicles.
Accelerated deductions for investments in certain business assets
and preferential tax rates for capital gains might be construed as pro-
viding benefits that are similar to tax-favored retirement accounts.
However, those benefits do not adequately duplicate the wealth ac-
cumulation advantage of tax-favored retirement vehicles. Common
tax attributes associated with the investment in, and disposition of,
small business assets are discussed below.
A. Investments In Business Assets
Investments in assets with a useful life extending substantially be-
yond the close of the taxable year generally may not be deducted.
Rather, such investments must be capitalized. 300 The capitalized cost
may be recovered on a tax-free basis, but the timing for that recovery
differs among various types of assets. 30 1 Timing has a potentially sig-
nificant impact on the tax benefits available to the taxpayer. As a
299. See Cruciano, Individual Income Tlax Returns, supra note 292.
300. See I.R.C. § 263(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in
1987).
301. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1993).
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general rule, it is better to accelerate, rather than defer, cost
recovery. 302
Property used in a trade or business that is subject to exhaustion,
wear and tear, or obsolescence, is eligible for periodic cost recovery
through depreciation.3 113 Prior to 1981, tax depreciation was focused
on estimating the total cost associated with the exhaustion of an asset
over its expected useful life, and allocating that cost over that life.30 4
As the Supreme Court has explained:
The end and purpose of it all [depreciation] is to approximate and
reflect the financial consequences to the taxpayer of the subtle ef-
fects of time and use on the value of his capital assets. For this pur-
pose it is sound accounting practice annually to accrue as to each
classification of depreciable property an amount which at the time it
is retired will with its salvage value replace the original investment
therein. Or as a layman might put it, the machine in its life time
must pay for itself before it can be said to pay anything to its
owner.
30 5
Although the Court's description mentions an effect on "value," it is
quite clear that historical cost, not actual market value, is the object of
tax depreciation. 30 6 Thus, this approach differs from an economic
measure of depreciation, which focuses on the actual decline in value
occurring each year.30 7
302. See generally GERTZMAN, supra note 45, at $ 1.01[2] (discussing significance of timing
issues).
303. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1994) (allowing "as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) . . . of
property used in the trade or business"); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1960) (tangible property);
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960) (intangible property with limited life); I.R.C. § 197 (1994) (amor-
tization of goodwill and certain other intangibles).
304. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-0 (as amended in 1964) ("Any reasonable and consistently
applied method of computing depreciation may be used or continued in use under section 167.
Regardless of the method used in computing depreciation, deductions for depreciation shall not
exceed such amounts as may be necessary to recover the unrecovered cost or other basis less
salvage during the remaining useful life of the property.").
305. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943).
306. See, e.g., id. at 101; Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 277 (1966)
("[T]ax law has long recognized the accounting concept that depreciation is a process of esti-
mated allocation which does not take account of fluctuations in valuation through market appre-
ciation."). As Professor Kahn explains, this treatment is a function of realization principles.
Depreciation is an allocation of the cost an owner incurs in acquiring an exhaustible
asset. The amount of cost that is allocable to the exhaustion of a portion of an asset's
life should not be reduced or increased merely because external market conditions
have changed the value of the remaining years of useful life: such unrealized apprecia-
tion or depreciation is not taken into account for tax purposes until realized.
Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - "Fax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measur-
ing Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1979).
307. See 1 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 91 23.1.4, at 23-10; CHEIRLS-FEIN, supra note 181,
at 154-55.
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Deducting the expected salvage value from the total cost to be re-
covered through depreciation ensured that only the expected eco-
nomic cost associated with the exhaustion of the asset was deductible.
However, the total depreciation deducted for tax purposes would not
always match the actual economic depreciation of an asset during its
useful life. To the extent that a taxpayer deducted more than the eco-
nomic depreciation, the taxpayer effectively received a tax benefit.30 8
The excess depreciation deduction may be recovered in a future year
if the taxpayer disposed of the asset for more than its salvage value.
However, the taxpayer retains the interim benefit of tax savings asso-
ciated with the deduction. 3119
The proper method of allocating the depreciated cost among tax
years has generated considerable academic debate. 310 Professor
Douglas A. Kahn outlined the core issues in his seminal article on this
topic:
The principal controversy over depreciation turns upon the methods
employed to allocate the cost or basis of the asset over the life of
the asset. If the taxpayer recovers part of the cost of the asset ear-
lier than is proper (i.e., if too much depreciation is allowed in the
early years of the asset's use), the taxpayer obtains a benefit to the
extent of the tax reduction caused by the excessive deduction. The
unwarranted depreciation deduction might never be recaptured;
even if it is recaptured, the taxpayer receives the use of the extra tax
reduction dollars until the excessive deduction is recaptured. The
taxpayer gains the value of deferring the tax until a later date, and
the dollar benefit of a tax deferral can be quite substantial. 311
In 1981, Congress ensured that businesses would reap tax benefits
from depreciation by enacting the Accelerated Cost Recovery System,
which abandoned the use of salvage value and generally allowed ac-
celerated cost recovery over periods much shorter than the actual use-
308. Of course, a tax detriment could also result if the actual salvage value turned out to be
less than the expected value. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 181, at 151.
3)9. It should be noted that the sale of the asset for more than its salvage value may be
attributed to inflation. In that case, the depreciation deduction is arguably inadequate from an
economic perspective. However, tax law does not take into account inflationary effects on de-
preciable assets. See id. at 150-51.
310. See Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measur-
ing Income? supra note 306, at 1-13; Water J. Blum, Accelerated Depreciation: A Proper Allow-
ance for Measuring Net Income?. , 78 MIcH. L. REV. 1172, 1184 (1980); Douglas A. Kahn,
Accelerated Depreciation Revisited - A Reply to Professor Blum, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1185-98
(1980); Calvin H. Johnson, Kahn's Accelerated Depreciation Is Not Normative, 53 TAX NOTES
858. 858 (Nov. 18, 1991); Douglas A. Kahn, Kahn Defends Stance of Accelerated Depreciation, 53
TAx No'iIs 1079, 1079-81 (Dec. 2, 1991).
311. See Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measur-
ing Income?, supra note 306, at 14.
[Vol. 50:49
2000] TRAVAILS OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ANT 101
ful life. Professor Marvin A. Chirelstein describes the effect of this
legislation as follows:
[Tihe Code in 1981 pretty well abandoned the notion that deprecia-
tion should be spread out over an asset's true useful life and instead
permits business taxpayer to depreciate their property over periods
that are (and are expected to be) much shorter than the periods of
actual service. In enacting the Acclerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) ... Congress' stated aim was to stimulate investment in
plant and equipment, and with this overriding goal in view it simply
discarded accuracy of measurement as an objective for the tax law
to pursue. 312
Regardless of one's views over whether accelerated depreciation
methods result in tax benefits that are in excess of those allowed by
normal income tax principles, 313 allowing a depreciation deduction for
the entire cost of a depreciable asset (including salvage value) over a
recovery period that is generally shorter than the economic useful life,
will clearly lower effective tax rates for business income. 314
Section 179 of the Code allows eligible taxpayers to receive an addi-
tional tax benefit by electing to expense up to $20,000 in expenditures
that would otherwise be capitalized and recovered through deprecia-
tion.315 This election is generally available for tangible property that
is used in a trade or business.3 t 6 The benefit is phased out to the ex-
tent that a taxpayer places in service more than $200,000 of eligible
property. 317 An expense deduction under section 179 is allowed only
to the extent of taxable income derived from the "active conduct by
312. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 181, at 151.
313. See supra note 309.
314. See I BlrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, 91 23.1.3, at 23-10 ("Even when the straight line
method is used [under ACRS] ...depreciation is usually accelerated by shortened recovery
periods and the rule allowing salvage to be ignored."). For a brief period, investment tax credits
combined with depreciation deductions may have actually generated negative tax rates on cer-
tain business investments. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement,
87 MicH. L. REV. 365, 392 (1988) ("Between 1981 and 1984, the combination of accelerated cost
recovery and the investment tax credit available to the purchaser of equipment could produce
tax savings which, in present value terms, exceeded the tax that would be imposed on the income
generated by the equipment. The result was, in effect, a negative rate of tax on income earned
on certain investments.").
315. See I.R.C. § 179 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The $20.000 limitation is in effect for the year
2000. I.R.C. § 179(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The limitation increases to $25,000 for taxable
years beginning in 2003 and beyond. Id.
316. See I.R.C. § 179(d)(1) (1994) (limiting section 179 property to "tangible property (to
which section 168 applies) which is section 1245 property (as defined in section 1245(a)(3)) and
which is acquired by purchase for use in the active conduct of a trade or business. Such term
shall not include any property described in section 50(b) and shall not include air conditioning or
heating units.").
317. See I.R.C. § 179(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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the taxpayer of any trade or business. ' '3t 8 In this way, the deduction
cannot be used to offset passive investment income.
The combined effect of current depreciation rules and the election
under section 179 to expense currently an otherwise capital expendi-
ture, may allow a small business owner to achieve tax benefits from
deferral. This effect is also experienced in a tax-favored retirement
plan. For example, consider a contractor who invests $100,000 in de-
preciable equipment used in her construction business. Assuming that
the applicable limitations in section 179 are satisfied, she may cur-
rently deduct $20,000. She would then be entitled to recover the re-
maining investment of $80,000 through depreciation. Assuming a five
year recovery period,319 the contractor would be entitled to deduct an
additional $16,000 in depreciation in the current year, 320 and the bal-
ance of the investment would be recovered over the next five taxable
years. 321 Alternatively, if the taxpayer had not elected to expense a
portion of this asset under section 179, the taxpayer would be entitled
to deduct $20,000 under section 168.322
This contractor is therefore eligible to take a total deduction of
$36,000 in connection with this investment; at least $16,000 of this de-
duction is discretionary.3 23 The deduction is likely to exceed the
amount that would otherwise be allowed under the pre-1981 measure
318. See I.R.C. § 179(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Income from the "active conduct of a
trade or business" includes income as an employee, so that an employee who is also self-em-
ployed may obtain this benefit, even though the business in which the asset is used is not profita-
ble in a particular year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.179-2(c)(6)(iv) (1992) ("For purposes of this section,
employees are considered to be engaged in the active conduct of the trade or business of their
employment. Thus, wages, salaries, tips, and other compensation (not reduced by unreimbursed
employee business expenses) derived by a taxpayer as an employee are included in the aggregate
amount of taxable income of the taxpayer under paragraph (c)(1) of this section.").
319. See Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, 678 (assigning 6-year class life and 5-year recovery
period to asset class 15.0, which includes "assets used in construction by general building, special
trade, heavy and marine construction contractors"), modified and clarified, Rev. Proc. 88-22,
1988-1 C.B. 785; I.R.C. § 168(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (property with class life of "more
than 4 [years] but less than 10 [years]" treated as "5-year property"); I.R.C. § 168(c) (Supp. IV
1998) (assigning 5-year recovery period to "5-year property").
320. See generally I.R.C. § 168 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (applying 200 percent declining bal-
ance method, 5-year recovery period, half-year convention). This calculation is based on Rev.
Proc. 87-57, Table 1, which illustrates the applicable depreciation percentage for year one is 20
percent. See Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 696.
321. See I.R.C. § 168 (1994). Cost recovery occurs over six taxable years due to the half-year
convention, which essentially treats any acquisition or disposition as occurring at the midpoint of
the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 168(d) (1994). No salvage value is taken into account. See I.R.C.
§ 168(b)(4) (1994).
322. $100,000 (cost basis) x .20 (from Rev. Proc. 87-57, Table 1) = $20,000. See Rev. Proc. 87-
57, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 696.
323. Although the section 179 election allows a deduction up to $20,000, that election reduces
basis for depreciation purposes, thereby reducing depreciation by $4,000. Thus, the net differ-
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of tax depreciation, which would have taken into account the eco-
nomic useful life and expected salvage value of this equipment. 324
This excess arguably provides a current-year tax benefit that is similar
to the benefit associated with an investment in a tax-favored account
such as an IRA.325 The current-year reduction in tax burden associ-
ated with this deduction effectively provides a reduction in the effec-
tive tax rate on business income, which is similar to a tax-exemption
on a portion of these earnings. 326 However, unlike the tax-favored
account, earnings from the business investment do not continue to en-
joy tax-deferred treatment prior to disposition. The business asset
may continue to generate taxable income after it has been depreci-
ated; that income is fully taxable. Moreover, disposition of the busi-
ness asset may also generate taxable income.
B. Sales of Business Property
Sales of depreciable business property can potentially recapture
previously allowed depreciation deductions. For example, assume
that the contractor in the above example 327 sells her equipment during
the following year for $100,000, an amount that reflects no economic
depreciation. The contractor will realize and recognize ordinary in-
come from this sale in an amount that equals her prior year combined
deductions under sections 179 and 168.328 Thus, economic income
that avoided taxation in the first year is taxed at disposition, thereby
ending the benefit of deferral.
The effect of the disposition is similar to a distribution from a tax-
favored account such as an IRA, since prior deductions are effectively
ence is $16,000. Deduction amounts under section 168 may also be affected by an election to use
an alternative depreciation system under I.R.C. § 168(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
324. It is also likely to exceed the amount of economic depreciation on the asset. However, as
Professor Kahn points out, the limitations imposed by the realization requirement may make
this an inappropriate benchmark. See supra note 306.
325. See supra Part II.C.
326. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 181, at 159.
327. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
328. To illustrate, if the taxpayer had deducted $20,000 under section 179 and depreciation of
$16,000 under section 168, the adjusted basis at the beginning of the second year would be
$64,000. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1994). In the second year, the taxpayer would be required to
deduct depreciation of $10,240, as the half-year convention treats this asset as disposed of mid-
way through the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 168(d) (1994); Rev. Proc. 87-57 1987-2 C.B. 687, 696,
Table 1. The adjusted basis of $53,760 ($64,000 - $10,240) is subtracted from the $100,000
amount realized, producing a gain of $46,240. The recapture provisions of I.R.C. § 1245 require
that this gain is characterized as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1245 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
Thus, the net impact of this disposition is an ordinary gain of $46,240 less $10,240 in current-year
depreciation, resulting in net income of $36,000 - the same amount as the taxpayer deducted in
the first year of ownership.
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recouped. 329 Taxpayers face the potential for adverse tax conse-
quences in these circumstances due to rate differentials between taxa-
ble years. For example, income from the sale of business assets may
have pushed the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket, thus diminishing
or perhaps even erasing the tax benefits from the prior year
deduction.
Preferential tax rates associated with capital gains may reduce the
impact of "bunching" income into a single tax year. 330 Capital gain
treatment, however, does not apply to gains associated with recap-
tured depreciation. 331 A seller might also attempt to spread out taxa-
ble income through utilizing the installment method.332 It is
important to note that the installment method does not provide an
effective solution to this problem. Section 453(i) of the Code requires
that any depreciation recapture associated with the asset must be
taken into account in the year of disposition.3 33 Thus, even though a
taxpayer may defer significant cash receipts until a future tax year, the
tax associated with recaptured depreciation deductions is nevertheless
accelerated.
This inability to dispose of business property and reinvest the pro-
ceeds without current tax consequences is a significant problem for
the business owner who wants to retire from an active business. As
long as the business owner continues to reinvest in business property,
the tax impact of dispositions can be moderated through similar ex-
change provisions, which defer tax on otherwise realized gains.334
However, a taxpayer retiring from an active trade or business may
need to reallocate his or her investment to other income-producing
329. See supra Part II.C.
330. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1954) ("The basic precept underlying
the capital gains theory of taxation as distinguished from ordinary income tax is the concept that
a person who has developed an enterprise in which earnings have been accumulated over a
period of years should not be required to expend the ordinary income tax rate in the one year
when he withdraws from his enterprise and realizes his gain.").
331. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (1994).
332. See I.R.C. § 453. The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999
eliminates the installment method for accrual basis taxpayers. See Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 536,
113 Stat. 1860, 1936 (1999). However, it remains available to cash basis taxpayers. See id. It
should be noted that seller financing may also serve a nontax purpose of facilitating the sale.
Seller financing may expand the pool of qualified purchasers (i.e., other capital-starved entrepre-
neurs). Small business advocates have expressed concerns about the impact of this amendment
on business valuation. See, Karen Hube, 'Fax Rule Crimps Small-Business Deals, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26. 2000, at Cl.
333. See I.R.C. § 453(i) (1994). See John 0. Everett, Structuring installment sales with recap-
ture, 65 J. TAX'N 66, 66 (August 1986). In addition, interest payments are required on deferred
taxes for certain installment sales of assets over $150,000. See I.R.C. § 453A (1994).
334. See I.R.C. § 1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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property, which cannot be done without tax consequences outside of a
tax-favored account.335 Thus, the self-employed person faces a signifi-
cant disadvantage in these circumstances as a result of having chosen
to invest in a small business instead of in a tax-favored account.
C. Dispositions at Death
There is one potential advantage enjoyed by the business owner
that is not available to the owner of a tax-favored account. The tax-
payer may effectively prevent the government from recapturing prior
tax benefits by dying while owning business property. 336 Returning
once again to the example of the contractor, assume that she passes
away while owning the equipment and leaves it to her heir when it is
worth $100,000. In these circumstances, the heir can acquire a basis of
$100,000, the fair market value of the assets on the date of death.337
This disposition at death does not trigger a recapture of prior tax ben-
efits by either the decedent or her heir.338 Thus, the decedent and her
estate go untaxed, and the heir could sell the asset and recover
$100,000 tax-free. Additionally, the heir could utilize the asset to ob-
tain depreciation deductions that will offset other taxable income
from her own trade or business. 339 On the other hand, if she had in-
herited a traditional IRA or similar tax-favored account, distributions
from that account would still be treated as taxable income.340
335. It theoretically may be possible to achieve diversification through a tax-free reorganiza-
tion or similar transaction, but such a transaction would generally require the cooperation of
other investors who are willing to acquire an interest in the business property. For example, a
small business owner in a sole proprietorship might choose to form a corporation with others
who are able to provide diversified interests, allowing the retiring owner to achieve a passive
investment interest in diversified holdings. However, other investors would presumably take
into account the tax detriments associated with these assets in valuing the business owner's con-
tribution. Moreover, this option is simply not practical for many small business owners, and it
entails additional risks and transaction costs that are not incurred within tax-favored accounts.
336. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1986 & Supp. 1998).
337. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1986 & Supp. 1998).
338. See I.R.C. § 1014(c) (1986 & Supp. 1998) (exempting "income in respect of a decedent
under section 691" from section 1014). Section 691, which defines income in respect of a dece-
dent, does not include depreciation recapture. I.R.C. § 691 (1986 & Supp. 1998). However,
income deferred under the installment method is considered income in respect of a decedent,
which is taxable after death. See I.R.C. § 691(a)(4) (1986 & Supp. 1998).
339. However, she could not elect to deduct this property under section 179, as it is not ac-
quired by "purchase" under section 179(d). See I.R.C. § 179(d)(2)(C)(ii) (1994) (excluding ac-
quisitions where basis is determined by reference to § 1014(a)).
340. See generally Gair Bennett Petrie, Estate Planning for Retirement Plans and IRAs, in
PRICE, supra note 77, at 313-18 (Supp. 1998) (discussing income tax factors affecting the benefi-
ciary of a spouse's retirement account).
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Section 1014 has endured in the Code despite considerable aca-
demic criticism. 3 4' Among other things, section 1014 is criticized as
aggravating the "lock-in effect," which inhibits redeployment of assets
and investment in order to avoid the income tax effects. 342 Untaxed
gains under section 1014 also cause significant leakage in the tax sys-
tem.3 43 Some commentators have proposed a rule of deemed realiza-
tion at death.3 44 Such a rule causes potential liquidity problems for
heirs who may require these assets to continue operating a family bus-
iness.345 Alternatively, a carryover basis system, similar to that im-
posed on inter vivos gifts, would avoid this liquidity problem and
ameliorate the "lock-in effect" associated with holding assets until
death.346 Congress enacted a carryover basis system in 1976, but then
repealed it retroactively in 1980.347 However, what Congress failed to
accomplish in section 1014 has been accomplished for assets held in
tax-favored retirement accounts. 348
V. SUGGESTED REFORMS
Legislative efforts to provide similar opportunities for self-em-
ployed persons to participate in the wealth-building benefits of tax-
favored retirement saving have fallen short of achieving parity with
employees. This is principally due to the fact that current law fails to
341. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VANo. L. REV. 361, 363-67 (1993);
Charles 0. Galvin, Taxing Gains at Death, A Further Comment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1526-31
(1993); Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts n Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1827, 1829-38 (1994).
342. See Dodge, supra note 341, at 1828.
343. A 1994 estimate by the Congressional Budget Office indicated that the Treasury foregoes
$9 billion in tax receipts each year from untaxed gains at death, while other commentators sug-
gest that it may be upwards of $30 billion. See id. at 1828 n.4. The current estimate for fiscal
2001 is $28.24 billion. See Treasury Dep't General Explanation of Clinton Administration's Fiscal
Year 2001 Revenue Proposals, supra note 16, at Table 5-3, (showing "Major Tax Expenditures in
the Income Tax, Ranked by Total 2001 Revenue Loss").
344. See Dodge, supra note 341, at 1838-44.
345. See Zelenak, supra note 341, at 367 (noting that carryover basis "imposes tax at a time
when the taxpayer is likely to have cash available to pay the tax."); id. at 436 ("An important
argument against taxation of capital gains at death is that the imposition of the tax on illiquid
estates consisting largely of farms or small businesses could lead to forced sales to raise cash to
pay the tax, thereby hastening the demise of the family farm and the small business person.").
Liquidity concerns are also reflected in recent efforts to ameliorate the effects of the estate tax
on family businesses. See H. REt'. No. 105-148, at 355-56 (1997) (expanding access to installment
payments "in order to better address the liquidity problems of estates holding farms and closely
held businesses, to prevent the liquidation of such businesses in order to pay estate taxes.").
346. Cf I.R.C. § 1015 (1994) (discussing generally the basis of property acquired by gifts and
transfers in trust).
347. See Dodge, supra note 341, at 1829 n.6.
348. See Fred B. Brown, "Complete" Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIFGO L. REV. 1559, 1569-70
(1996).
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take into account the capital formation needs of the entrepreneur. A
significant number of self-employed business owners lack the practical
ability to reap the wealth-building benefits of tax deferral, despite
committing resources to investments that may also provide replace-
ment income after retirement. Unlike nonsavers who choose a grass-
hopper's lifestyle of consumption, these entrepreneurs are models of
ant-like behavior, though their savings efforts are treated disparately
from their employee counterparts. Several reforms could ameliorate
these differences and provide additional social benefits.
A. Expanded Loan Availability and Penalty Exemptions
Although restrictions on accessing retirement investments ensure
that invested funds will be available at retirement, those restrictions
may inhibit retirement saving, particularly by lower-income savers. 349
Congress has responded by enacting exceptions from excise penalty
provisions for funds withdrawn from IRAs in limited circumstances,
including purchasing a first home, paying for medical expenses, and
paying for higher education. 3511 Moreover, employer-provided plans
may allow employees to borrow based on their retirement assets, thus
providing emergency access to funds which is likely to enhance partici-
pation by lower-income taxpayers. 351
Self-employed business owners lack similar options to access retire-
ment account assets for business needs. IRAs cannot be used as col-
lateral for a loan, and the limited exceptions to the excise penalty
provisions do not cover business investments. 352 Keogh plans are not
eligible for the exceptions to the excise penalty provisions associated
with IRAs,353 and prohibited transaction rules do not allow loans to a
business owner for any purpose. 35 4
Small business owners with profitable years may be willing to invest
a portion of those profits in a tax-favored retirement account if they
are assured that this capital will be available for emergency purposes,
including future business investment. Eliminating penalty excise taxes
on distributions used for business investments would be one approach
to allowing access; expanded loan provisions would be another.
349. See supra note 236.
350. See supra notes 226-31.
351. See supra notes 239-43.
352. See supra notes 226-31 (distributions), 236-37 (loans). See also Kovach, supra note 23, at
170-71 (proposing loan provisions for IRAs to induce participation by rank and file em-
ployees).
353. See supra notes 226-31.
354. See supra notes 244-48.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Distributions from retirement accounts would reduce assets de-
voted specifically to retirement saving, though this would not necessa-
rily have an adverse affect on retirement security. Social Security
continues to provide a minimum safety net, therefore risk taking with
discretionary retirement savings should not be problematic. After all,
retirement accounts that permit self-directed investment do not pro-
scribe high-risk investments. Paternalistic concerns should not over-
shadow the potential for enhancing personal economic growth in this
context. The possibility of access is likely to encourage small business
owner participation. Moreover, if such access is expanded to em-
ployer-provided accounts, it may also encourage business formation
by employees who are willing to become entrepreneurs if they had
access to capital.355
Changing the prohibited transaction rules to allow loans from Ke-
ogh plans and IRAs will also encourage participation. If loans from
qualified plans are allowed for employees, it is difficult to justify the
denial of a similar benefit to self-employed persons who also face fi-
nancial needs, whether for business or otherwise. 356 In fact, loans may
present an even better option than penalty-free distributions, to the
extent that they avoid current income tax effects associated with dis-
tributions and require continued commitment to long-term investment
for retirement. Whereas business investments outside of tax-favored
accounts can be converted to consumption, loan repayments will tend
to ensure that capital is retained for retirement purposes.
B. Expanded Contribution Options at Transition Events
Contribution options should also be expanded to neutralize the tax
impact of transitioning to retirement. Tax liabilities upon the disposi-
tion of business assets may significantly reduce assets available to pro-
vide replacement income for retirement years.357 Current rules
defining income from self-employment, which is eligible for contribu-
tion to a tax-favored account, exclude gains from the sale of business
assets. 358 Thus, income from the sale of business assets cannot be
355. See supra note 24 (discussing capital scarcity as a limit on small business formation).
356. Recent legislative proposals have included expanded borrowing options, but to date
these provisions have not been enacted. See H.R. 106-2488, § 1202 (1999) (proposing to exempt
loans from prohibited transaction treatment): S. Ri-, 106-1867, § 103 (1999) (expanding availa-
bility of loans to owner-employees and shareholder employees with less than 25 percent owner-
ship interests).
357. See supra note 335.
358. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-6 (as amended in 1965). Characterization as a section 1231
asset does not affect eligibility. Regulations provide the following example to illustrate the con-
cept of income from self-employment:
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used as the basis for a Keogh plan contribution during the year of the
sale.
3 5 9
Allowing gains from business property to be included in self-em-
ployment income and increasing the allowable contribution amount
for the sale of business assets would ameliorate some of the disparate
treatment associated with small business investment, as compared to a
tax-favored account. For example, assume that a small business
owner sells her business for $500,000, and for simplicity assume that
all the proceeds would otherwise be treated as taxable income. Al-
lowing a contribution of $500,000 to a tax-favored account would de-
fer tax on this gain, permitting investment of $500,000, rather than a
significantly lower after-tax amount.360
In order to ensure that this provision is linked to enhanced retire-
ment security, the allowable contribution amount could be tied to a
maximum total balance of tax-favored accounts held by the taxpayer.
For example, the total could be linked to an amount that would pro-
vide lifetime income equivalent to the maximum defined benefit al-
lowed under an employer-provided plan.361 Limiting the total benefit
During the taxable year 1954, A, who owns a grocery store, realized a net profit of
$1,500 from the sale of groceries and a gain of $350 from the sale of a refrigerator case.
During the same year, he sustained a loss of $2,000 as a result of damage by fire to the
store building. In computing taxable income, all of these items are taken into account.
In determining net earnings from self-employment, however, only the $1,500 of profit
derived from the sale of groceries is included. The $350 gain and the $2,000 loss are
excluded.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-6(b) (as amended in 1965).
359. See I.R.C. § 401(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring plans for "owner-employees" to provide
that "contributions on behalf of any owner-employee may be made only with respect to the
earned income of such owner-employee which is derived from the trade or business with respect
to which such plan is established."). I.R.C. § 1402(c)(2) (1994) (defining "earned income" in
relation to "net earnings from self-employment"). Such a contribution might be possible if the
owner-employee had adequate earned income, but sales of business assets other than inventory
would not constitute earned income. See Treas. Reg. 1.1402(a)-6(a)(i)-(ii) (as amended in 1965)
(treating "stock in trade or other property of a kind which would properly be includible in inven-
tory if on hand at the close of the taxable year . . . [and] property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business" as property that can give rise to income
from self-employment).
360. Assuming that all of this gain is ordinary, (i.e., a sale of fully depreciated assets for no
more than their respective original costs), the potential tax liability would be approximately
$171,161, leaving only $328,839 to be invested for retirement income. See Rev. Proc. 98-61,
1998-52 I.R.B. 18 (Dec. 28, 1998), Table 1 - section l(a) (1999 Tax Table for Married Filing Joint
Returns).
361. As of 1999, this figure is $130,000. See supra note 93. For example, a retiree with a life
expectancy of ten years would be able to contribute $798,793.72 assuming a 10 percent interest
rate. (This figure represents the net present value of $130,000 per year for ten years with a 10
percent return.). This approach would potentially allow different levels of tax benefits based on
the taxpayer's age at disposition, which may have a distorting effect on retirement decisions. For
example, someone retiring early might be able to defer tax on more income than a later retiree,
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in this manner ensures that this provision does not create a windfall
for those who have already taken advantage of tax-deferred savings
opportunities. Such a limit reflects the purpose of enhancing retire-
ment security, rather than simply providing another means of tax
avoidance.
Allowing small business owners to defer contributions to their own
retirement accounts is unlikely to have an adverse effect on providing
workplace retirement benefits for their employees. "Catch up" con-
tributions are a second-best solution to tax-favored saving early in life,
and this approach does not change that economic reality. Small busi-
ness owners with available funds should still prefer saving in tax-fa-
vored form. Moreover, employee demand will continue to be an
important factor in an employer's decision to offer a workplace retire-
ment plan.3 62 Small business owners who are also employers will pre-
sumably meet these demands when it is cost effective to do so. 363
Allowing deductible retirement contributions to offset income from
the sale of business assets would also ameliorate the "lock-in effect"
associated with the current rules of section 1014.364 This policy has
the potential to provide a general economic benefit in ensuring that
assets are deployed efficiently and productively, rather than held to
avoid current tax consequences. Current-year revenue losses associ-
ated with deferring taxation on business gains may be partially offset
by future taxation of distributions which would include income that
will otherwise go untaxed under section 1014. Thus, enhanced retire-
ment security and greater horizontal equity for small business owners
may not be as costly to the public fisc as they might seem.
thus encouraging early retirement. An alternative approach based on a fixed level of maximum
savings regardless of age may be preferable, as it would avoid potential distortions in retirement
decisions under age-based formulas.
362. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (noting employee preferences considered
"most important" factor by 17 percent of employers and "major" factor by 53 percent of em-
ployers considering retirement plans); see also supra note 285 and accompanying text (noting
"increased employee demand" cited by 49 percent of employers as leading them to consider
offering a retirement plan).
363. It may also be possible to use this alternative of tax-favored saving as a tool to encourage
small business owners to establish workplace plans for their employees. However, such an ap-
proach must be sensitive to the costs imposed on small business owners, and the practical con-
straints of capital formation that otherwise appear to inhibit participation.
364. See supra part IV.C.
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